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PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER
NONRESIDENT PUBLISHERS AND
AUTHORS: WHAT CONTACTS
ARE NEEDED AFTER
KEETON v. HUSTLER MAGAZINE, INC.,
AND CALDER v. JONES
Historically, plaintiffs seeking to litigate defamation' claims against maga-
zine and newspaper publishers have had difficulty obtaining personal juris-
diction2 over them outside their states of incorporation or principal place of
business. Traditional tests for jurisdiction developed under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment3 were too narrow to allow suit.4 These
tests required a corporation to be present and doing business in the forum
state before a court could assert jurisdiction.5 Most publishers transacted
little business outside their home states, having consigned delivery and sale
of their publications to independent contractors.6 Similarly, plaintiffs were
unable to obtain jurisdiction over authors outside their states of domicile,
unless they were present in the forum state or had consented to suit there.7
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,8 the United States Supreme
Court relaxed due process requirements to allow jurisdiction over a defend-
ant who had "minimum contacts" with the forum state. Jurisdiction under
this new test was to depend not on the defendant's presence in the forum
1. Defamation, as used in this Note, refers to all causes of action for injury to reputation,
including libel, slander, and invasion of privacy. For a comprehensive discussion of these
torts, see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 111-117 (5th ed. 1984). See
also R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS (1980).
2. For a judgment of a court to be given full faith and credit by other courts, the adjudi-
cating court must have jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. For a general discussion
of the requirements for obtaining personal jurisdiction, see 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, §§ 1065-1069 (1969 & Supp. 1985). See also Developments in
the Law, State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1960); Kurland, The Supreme
Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts-From Pen-
noyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569 (1958).
3. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
4. See Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction over Publishers: To Chill a Mocking Word, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 342 (1967).
5. See generally Note, Recent Interpretations of "Doing Business" Statutes, 44 IOWA L.
REV. 345 (1959).
6. See infra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 256 and accompanying text.
8. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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state, but on the "quality and nature of the [defendant's] activity"9 and the
fairness of requiring the defendant to stand trial there.10 Despite the more
flexible minimum contacts standard, state and lower federal courts remained
reluctant to hear cases against nonresident publishers and authors because of
their limited in-state activity. 1 At the same time, courts began to assert
jurisdiction over other types of businesses formerly outside their purview,
most notably product manufacturers.12 Like publishers, many product man-
ufacturers marketed their products through independent middlemen.
Courts holding them subject to suit reasoned that suit was fair because the
manufacturer had "elect[ed] to sell its products for ultimate use" in the fo-
rum state.13 This rationale became known as the stream of commerce the-
ory. 4 Eventually courts begat, to use the stream of commerce theory to
assert jurisdiction over nonresident publishers. 5 The focus thus shifted
from a publisher's business activity to its circulation in the forum state.
With the shift in focus, the question arose at what point a publisher's cir-
culation would be too insignificant for jurisdiction. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that a greater showing of contacts
was necessary for publishers than for other types of businesses because of
first amendment considerations. 6 Other courts rejected this argument.' 7
They chose to consider the effect the publisher had caused in the forum
state, focusing on the foreseeability of injury.'s
For the first time, the United States Supreme Court recently considered
what contacts are required for personal jurisdiction over nonresident pub-
lishers and authors. 9 In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,2° the Supreme
9. Id. at 319.
10. Id. at 315, 319.
11. See infra notes 124-26, 134-39, 148-55 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Elkhart Eng'g Corp. v. Dornier Werke, 343 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965); Gray
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Il1. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
13. See Gray, 22 Ill. 2d at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
14. See generally Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdic-
tion for Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533; Comment, The Long-Arm Reach of the Courts Under
the Effect Test After Kulko v. Superior Court, 65 VA. L. Ry. 175 (1979).
15. See infra notes 170-81 and accompanying text.
16. See New York Times v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1966).
17. See, e.g., Anselmi v. Denver Post, 552 F.2d 316 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 911
(1977); Appleyard v. Transamerican Press, 539 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1041 (1977).
18. This jurisdictional theory is called the effects test. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971). Section 37 provides that:
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who causes ef-
fects in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to any cause of action arising
from these effects unless the nature of the effects and of the individual's relationship
to the state make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.
19. The Court had granted certiorari on the issue once before, in Polizzi v. Cowles Maga-
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Court reversed the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, to
hold that Hustler's regular circulation of its magazine in New Hampshire
was sufficient for jurisdiction, even though neither the plaintiff nor the de-
fendant resided there.21 Complicating the matter was the fact that the ac-
tion was a suit for nationwide damages under the single publication rule.22
The Court concluded that Hustler's contacts, coupled with the state's inter-
est in redressing torts occurring within its borders and in cooperating with
other states through the single publication rule, were sufficient to support the
multistate suit. 23
In Calder v. Jones,24 decided along with Keeton, the Court held that Cali-
fornia could assert jurisdiction over a Florida author and editor solely on the
grounds that they had intentionally written and edited an article that they
knew would injure the plaintiff in California. 25 The Court based its holding
on the defendants' intentional conduct expressly aimed at California.26 It
did not require a showing of presence in California for jurisdiction.27 The
Court also rejected the need for a greater showing of contacts for first
amendment considerations, reasoning that the first amendment was better
considered during trial on the merits.28
This Note will trace the Supreme Court's development of due process
standards for personal jurisdiction and will discuss how state and lower fed-
eral courts have applied these standards to nonresident publishers and au-
thors. Next it will examine the Keeton and Calder opinions. Finally it will
discuss the implications of these decisions for determining personal jurisdic-
tion over nonresident publishers and authors.
zine, Inc., 345 U.S. 663 (1953), but had decided the case on other grounds. In dissent, Justice
Black argued that the Court should have decided the minimum contacts issue. Id. at 671
(Black, J., dissenting).
20. 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
21. Id. at 1478.
22. The single publication rule allows a plaintiff to recover all damages from the publica-
tion of a single issue of a magazine, book, or newspaper in one suit. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 577A (1977). Ordinarily, each copy circulated would give rise to a separate
cause of action for defamation. The single publication rule is, thus, an exception to the general
rule. It has now been accepted in a majority of states. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 577A reporter's note. For a discussion of the historical background of the rule, see Buckley
v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 179-80 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.). For a discussion
of how the single publication rule has been used by courts, see Leflar, The Single Publication
Rule, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 263 (1953). For a discussion of some of the choice of law
problems that may arise, see Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MIcH. L. REV. 959 (1953).
23. Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1481-82.
24. 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984).
25. Id. at 1488.
26. Id. at 1487.
27. Id. at 1486 n.6.
28. Id. at 1487-88.
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I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
A. The Early Statutes
At common law, personal jurisdiction over a defendant could be achieved
only with his consent to suit or by his domicile or presence within the
boundaries of the state.29 These jurisdictional bases worked well enough in a
localized society, but as travel and commerce between the states began to
grow, more was needed to facilitate adjudication of disputes where they
arose. In the mid-nineteenth century, states began to enact statutes ex-
tending their jurisdictional powers. The Supreme Court upheld these stat-
utes,3 ° but declared that they, like the traditional bases for jurisdiction, must
not offend the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.3"
Under the early statutes, jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation de-
pended on whether it carried on business within the state's borders. 32 "Do-
ing business" was shown by the activities of the corporation's agents within
the forum state. For a state's exercise of jurisdiction to meet due process,
the activities of the agents not only had to be substantial, they also had to
show consummation of a business transaction.33 Thus, a corporation that
solicited business in the state, even a considerable amount of business, but
did nothing more, was held not to be doing business, only engaging in "mere
solicitation."'34 However, when a corporation not only solicited orders but
also made deliveries and received partial payment in the state, the Supreme
29. See Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 915-16. The United States Supreme
Court has held these traditional bases satisfy due process. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1878) (presence); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) (domicile); National Equip.
Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964) (consent).
30. See Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856).
31. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882).
32. Initially a corporation was thought to have legal existence only in its state of incorpo-
ration. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1838) (dictum). The first statutes
authorizing jurisdiction over nonresident corporations, therefore, were based on a theory of
implied consent; in exchange for the privilege of transacting business within the state's borders,
the corporation was deemed to have consented to the jurisdiction of its courts. See Lafayette
Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856). After holding in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1878), that a nonresident individual must be physically present in the forum state for
valid service of process, the Court then reconsidered the dictum in Bank of Augusta. In St.
Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882), the Court effectively overruled the notion that a corporation
could not be present outside its chartering state. Recognizing that a corporation acts only
through its agents, the Court stated that a corporation is present in a state when its agents
conduct its business there. Id. at 355. Thus, under both the consent and presence theories,
jurisdiction over a corporation depended on its doing business in the state.
33. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. at 355.
34. Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907) (no jurisdiction in
Pennsylvania over a railroad company whose only in-state activity was to solicit passengers
and freight for its lines in other states).
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Court found a "continuous course of business" sufficient for jurisdiction.35
This rule became known as "solicitation plus."'36 The Court also held that a
parent company could not be subjected to jurisdiction for the activities of a
subsidiary in the forum state; the two were separate legal entities.37 Simi-
larly, a corporation could not be brought within the ambit of the state's
courts by the activities of other companies marketing its services.3" To do so
would be to base jurisdiction on constructive presence and could render a
large multistate corporation subject to suit in all states.3 9
The common law bases of jurisdiction also proved too limited for individ-
uals in a mobile society. Although for the most part nonresident individuals
were not subject to the doing business statutes,4° they could be sued for torts
they committed while driving in the forum state. In Hess v. Pawloski4l the
Court approved "nonresident motorist statutes" on the grounds that the de-
fendant had given implied consent to suit by using the state's highways and
that driving is a dangerous activity that the state has the right to regulate.
These jurisdictional tests produced conceptual and practical difficulties.
The underlying rationales of presence and implied consent were clearly only
fictions.4 2 The doing business test itself became a mechanical exercise in
which jurisdiction depended more on the similarity of facts with decided
cases than with the reasonableness or fairness of requiring the defendant to
appear.43 National businesses deliberately organized their activities along
the lines of these tests to avoid jurisdiction. At one point the Supreme Court
35. See International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 585 (1914);
See also St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913) (jurisdiction allowed in New
York over a railroad company that maintained an office there to solicit business and to process
claims for damages).
36. Very little additional business was necessary to meet the "solicitation plus" standard.
See Note, Recent Interpretations of "Doing Business" Statutes, 44 IOWA L. REV. 345, 352
(1959).
37. See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 336 (1925); Peterson v.
Chicago Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 205 U.S. 364, 393 (1907). See also Peoples Tobacco Co. v.
American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 84 (1918).
38. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 268 (1917). See Bank of Am.
v. Whitney Cent. Nat'l Bank, 261 U.S. 171, 173 (1923).
39. McKibbin, 243 U.S. at 268.
40. See Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289, 293 (1919). But see Henry L. Doherty & Co. v.
Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 628 (1935).
41. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
42. See Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 140-41 (1930) (L. Hand, J.)
(calling presence essentially "an estimate of the inconveniences" of standing trial); Smolik v.
Philadelphia & Reading Co., 222 F. 148, 151 (1915) (L. Hand, J.) (calling consent a legal
fiction).
43. See Cleary & Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois Courts, 50 Nw. U.L.
REV. 599 (1955); Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809, 810-12 (1935).
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turned to the commerce clause to decide a line of cases,' but eventually it
realized that a comprehensive test with more flexibility than the doing busi-
ness test was needed.
B. International Shoe Co. v. Washington and the Minimum Contacts Test
The Court announced such a test in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton.4" In International Shoe, the State of Washington sued the International
Shoe Company for failure to contribute to its unemployment compensation
fund. In challenging the state's jurisdiction, the company claimed it was not
doing business in the state. Although the company was incorporated and
headquartered outside Washington, it did employ eleven to thirteen resident
salesmen to solicit orders in the state.46 Using the solicitation plus theory,
the Supreme Court of Washington held that the company was doing busi-
ness sufficient for jurisdiction.47
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, but chose to base its holding
on a new theory, that of "minimum contacts." The Court described the
minimum contacts test as an inquiry into whether "the maintenance of the
suit . . .offend[ed] 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice.' "" What was reasonable and fair under this test depended on the
"quality and nature" of the defendant's activity and the relationship of the
activity to the cause of action.49 The Court described how this test could be
applied in several hypothetical fact patterns. It suggested that the minimum
contacts test clearly would be met when the defendant had engaged in "con-
tinuous and systematic" activity in the state and the cause of action was
related to that activity.5 ° In fact, the Court implied that substantial and
continuous activity of a special nature might justify jurisdiction over causes
of action arising outside the forum. 1 Although a state's exercise of jurisdic-
tion would be unwarranted if based on occasional acts unrelated to the cause
of action, jurisdiction based on some single or isolated act, such as commit-
ting a tort while driving in the state, would be enough because of its nature
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For a discussion of these cases, see Developments in the
Law, supra note 2, at 983-87.
45. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
46. Id. at 313.
47. 22 Wash. 2d 146, 154 P.2d 801 (1945).
48. 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940)).
49. Id. at 319.
50. Id. at 317.
51. Id. at 318. Jurisdiction over causes of action unrelated to the defendant's contacts
with the forum state is called general jurisdiction. See generally von Mehren & Trautman,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121 (1966).
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and circumstances.52 Nevertheless, the Court stated, exercise of jurisdiction
over an individual or corporation that had no contacts with the state would
violate due process.53 In the instant case, the Court found the International
Shoe Company's in-state activity not only systematic and continuous, but
also related to the cause of action.54 The Court upheld Washington's
jurisdiction.
In International Shoe, the Court refrained from overruling its prior deci-
sions. Instead, it used earlier cases to show how the minimum contacts test
should be applied. Nevertheless, the minimum contacts test clearly was in-
tended to go beyond prior rulings by allowing courts to be more flexible. In
addition, it was to apply to individuals as well as to corporations.55
Subsequent decisions have refined the test and marked its boundaries. In
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. 56 the Court considered a case in
which the cause of action arose from activities unrelated to the defendant's
contacts with the forum state. The plaintiff, a nonresident of Ohio, brought
suit in that state for dividends she claimed from the defendant's mining oper-
ations in the Philippines.57 Although the defendant was a Filipino corpora-
tion, its president had taken up residence in Ohio during the Japanese
occupation of the islands in World War II. From Ohio the president had
carried on the company's business, maintaining an office with the corporate
files and two bank accounts from which he made corporate payments. The
company had held its directors' meetings in Ohio as well.5" The Court
found these activities to constitute "a continuous and systematic, but lim-
ited, part of [the company's] general business." 59 As such, the Court al-
lowed Ohio to accept jurisdiction, even though the claim related to the
mining operations in the Philippines.
The Court next turned to a case involving only a single contact with the
forum state. In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. ," California as-
serted jurisdiction over a Texas insurance company whose only contact with
the state had been to insure the plaintiff's decedent.6 The Supreme Court,
52. 326 U.S. at 318.
53. Id. at 319.
54. Id. at 320.
55. The minimum contacts test was first applied in Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457
(1940), a case concerning jurisdiction over an individual based on domicile. In International
Shoe the Court discussed the test in terms of both corporations and individuals. See Interna-
tional Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
56. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
57. Id. at 438-39.
58. Id. at 447-48.
59. Id. at 438.
60. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
61. Id. at 221-22. The decedent, a California resident, had bought a life insurance policy
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noting a discernible trend toward expanding the scope of personal jurisdic-
tion, unanimously upheld the state court. Justice Black, writing for the
Court, stated that due process was not violated in this case because the in-
surance contract had a "substantial connection" with the forum state: the
insurance company had sent the contract to California, the insured had re-
sided there, and he had mailed his premiums from there.62 Also supporting
the fairness of jurisdiction were the state's interest in providing an accessible
forum for its residents to adjudicate insurance claims, shown by its enact-
ment of the insurance regulatory statute under which the case was brought;
the cost disadvantage to plaintiffs with small claims in having to travel to the
defendant's state to vindicate their rights; and the difficulty of transporting
crucial witnesses to the defendant's home state.63 In comparison, any incon-
venience to the insurer caused by having to defend in California was
insignificant. 64
Later the same term, in another case involving a single contact, the Court
warned that limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction still existed. 65 In Han-
son v. Denckla,66 a divided Court reversed Florida's assertion of jurisdiction
over a Delaware trust company. The Delaware company had been trustee
for a trust established in Delaware by a Florida resident while she was living
in Pennsylvania. 67 After the settlor had moved to Florida, she and the
trustee had corresponded, the trustee had sent her trust income, and the
settlor had executed two powers of appointment. 6' The majority found that
the trustee had performed no act in Florida sufficient for jurisdiction. Juris-
diction could not be based on the "unilateral activity" of someone associated
with the defendant, such as the settlor in this case. 69 Rather, the defendant
must have "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within the forum [s]tate,"7° to the degree that it enjoyed "the benefits
and protections of [the forum state's] laws."'" The majority distinguished
from a company that subsequently sold the policy to the defendant. The defendant offered to
insure the decedent on the same terms as its predecessor. The decedent accepted and paid the
premiums from California until his death. Id.
62. Id. at 223.
63. Id.
64. Id. For a discussion of the implications of the McGee decision, see Reese & Galston,
Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. REV. 249
(1959).
65. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
66. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
67. Id. at 252.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 253.
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
1132 [Vol. 34:1125
Personal Jurisdiction
Hanson from McGee on the grounds that the insurance company in McGee
had solicited the contract, and the state, by statute, had shown special inter-
est in regulating the insurance industry.72
In a strong dissent, Justice Black argued that the issue in the dispute, the
validity of the power of appointment of the trust assets, had a substantial
connection to Florida because Florida was charged with construing the set-
tlor's will.73 He would have allowed jurisdiction in such a case unless the
litigation was so inconvenient to the defendant that it would offend due pro-
cess.74 Weighing the conveniences, as he did in McGee, Justice Black con-
cluded that Florida was a convenient forum for all the parties.75 Florida, as
the state administering the will, had a strong interest in the matter.76 In
addition, allowing suit to go forward in Florida would avoid the problem of
multiple litigation.77
Many commentators considered Hanson wrongly decided.78 They pre-
ferred the "center of gravity" approach of Justice Black's dissent. Neverthe-
less, for almost twenty years the Court remained silent on the question.
When it did address the issue in Shaffer v. Heitner,79 it reaffirmed Hanson's
purposeful availment test. 0 In Shaffer, the Court summarized the test of
International Shoe as focusing on "the relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation.""1 Only Justice Brennan, in dissent, argued that a
court should consider the relationship "between the controversy, the parties
72. Id. at 251-52.
73. Id. at 258 (Black, J., dissenting). The testatrix had executed the appointment in Flor-
ida; the primary beneficiaries lived there; and Florida law would be applied. Id.
74. Id. at 258-59.
75. Id. at 259. Not only did the primary beneficiaries live there, the Delaware trustee had
maintained an ongoing business relationship with the testatrix while she resided in Florida. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 261. Justice Douglas dissented in a separate opinion. Id. at 262 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). He maintained that because the trustee was in privity with the settlor, the trustee
would be represented in the proceedings by the settlor's executrix. Id. at 263. Florida should
have the right to determine the interests in the trust without personal jurisdiction over the
trustee. Id. at 262-64.
78. See, e.g., Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State
Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 227 (1967); Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction,
1965 Sup. Cr. REV. 241; Reese & Galston, supra note 64, at 257-58; Traynor, Is This Conflict
Really Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REV. 657 (1959); von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adju-
dicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966); Developments in the Law, supra
note 2, at 909; but see, Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach:
A Comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L.
REv. 407 (1980).
79. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
80. Id. at 216.
81. Id. at 204.
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and the forum [s]tate. ' '12
C. The Effects Test and Due Process
McGee suggested that jurisdiction could be asserted if the cause of action
was related to an extraterritorial act that had produced in-state conse-
quences. Hanson indicated that the act must have a purposeful relationship
to the forum state. From these two cases the drafters of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws developed the "effects test."83 They concluded
that if the defendant intended to cause an effect in the forum state by an
extraterritorial act, exercise of jurisdiction should be proper. For example, if
a gunman intentionally fired across a state line, he should be amenable to
jurisdiction in the state where injury occurred. 4 If the effect was reasonably
foreseeable, although not intended, the drafters of the Restatement (Second)
suggested that a court weigh the relationships of both the defendant and the
plaintiff to the state, the nature and quality of the effect caused, and the
inconvenience to the defendant in having to stand trial in the state.85 The
greater the relationship of either the defendant or the plaintiff to the state,
the more appropriate jurisdiction would be. Similarly, if an effect that was
foreseeable and that actually occurred was of a sort dangerous to persons or
property, jurisdiction would be proper even without additional contacts by
the defendant. On the other hand, if the effect was not dangerous, other
contacts of the defendant with the forum state might be required. Finally,
jurisdiction would be improper if the effect caused was neither intended nor
foreseeable. 86
In Kulko v. California Superior Court87 and World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 8 the Supreme Court examined jurisdiction based on the
foreseeability theory of the effects test. In Kulko, a child support action,
California asserted jurisdiction over a New York father who had allowed his
daughter to stay with her mother in California during his agreed custody
period.89 The state court reasoned that, by consenting to her stay in Califor-
82. Id. at 225 (emphasis added).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971). See supra note 18.
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 comment a (1971).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
88. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
89. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 89. The couple had two children. The father had given his daugh-
ter a one-way plane ticket to California at her request. Later, the mother had mailed a plane
ticket to the son so that he could come live with her. The father's only other contacts with
California were two military stopovers in the state several years before. The California
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court did not consider these contacts jurisdic-
tionally significant. Id. at 87.
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nia, the father had caused an effect there sufficient for jurisdiction.9 ° The
United States Supreme Court, after determining that the father's act failed to
meet Hanson's purposeful availment test,91 pointed out that it also failed to
meet the effects test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.92 The
father had caused no physical injury in California, nor had he gained com-
mercial benefit from his act.93 In sum, his act gave him no reason to expect
to be "haled before a [California] court,"94 and thus, jurisdiction was
improper.95
In World- Wide Volkswagen, Oklahoma asserted jurisdiction over the New
York distributor and retailer of a car that had been purchased in New York,
had been driven to Oklahoma, and had been involved in an accident there.96
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma reasoned that jurisdiction properly could
be exercised because a car dealer can reasonably foresee the use of cars it has
sold in states beyond its sales district.97 The United States Supreme Court
reversed. The majority opinion began by stating that the minimum contacts
test serves to protect the defendant from inconvenient suit and to ensure that
states do not overreach their boundaries when exercising jurisdiction.98
Although the fairness of exercising jurisdiction depends on balancing the
inconvenience of suit to the defendant against the interests of the forum
state, the plaintiff, and the shared policies of all the states,99 jurisdiction can-
90. Id. at 88-89.
91. Id. at 93-94.
92. Id. at 96-97 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971)).
See supra note 18. The Court observed, however, that the Restatement was not binding on its
decision. 436 U.S. at 96.
93. 436 U.S. at 96-97. The Court implied that if the father had caused physical injury or
benefited commercially, jurisdiction might have been reasonable.
94. Id. at 97-98 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 216).
95. 436 U.S. at 101. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice White and Justice Powell, dis-
sented. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). He would have weighed the facts differently and allowedjurisdiction. Id. at 101-02. For a discussion of Kulko and its implications, see Comment,
supra note 14.
96. World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288. Also joined in the suit were the car's man-
ufacturer and importer. The manufacturer and importer did not challenge jurisdiction beyond
the appeals court level. Id.
97. Id. at 290.
98. Id. at 291-92. In Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694 (1982),
the Court described these two elements as "a function of the individual liberty interest pre-
served by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 702 n.10.
99. Specifically, the Court stated that:
Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the burden on
the defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an appropriate case be consid-
ered in light of other relevant factors, including the forum [s]tate's interest in adjudi-
cating the dispute, see McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957);
the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, see Kulko v. Cali-
fornia Superior Court ... at least when that interest is not adequately protected by
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not be exercised unless the defendant has had a contact with the forum
state." In this case, the car retailer and distributor had transacted no busi-
ness in Oklahoma. Their only tie to the state was the fact that one of the
cars they had sold was driven there by a customer."' 1 The Court concluded
that such a "fortuitous circumstance" could not suffice for jurisdiction.1 12
With respect to Oklahoma's reasoning that jurisdiction was proper be-
cause the car could foreseeably be used in Oklahoma, the Court noted that
the foreseeability required for jurisdiction was not the mere possibility that a
product might enter the forum state,1"3 but the likelihood that the defend-
ant, by its acts and relationship to the forum state, might reasonably expect
to be haled into court there. " In dictum, the Court found this type of
foreseeability demonstrated by a corporation's acts to market its products in
the forum state, either directly or indirectly.' 0 5 The corporation would have
"purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum [s]tate" and thus, should reasonably foresee being asked to stand
trial there for injuries arising from the sale of its products. 106
the plaintiff's power to choose the forum, cf. Shaffer V Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211
n.37 (1977); the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several [s]tates in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies, see Kulko v. California Superior Court.
444 U.S. at 292.
100. Id. at 294 (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S at 319).
101. 444 U.S. at 295.
102. Id. at 299.
103. Id. at 297. The Court likened this form of foreseeability to "mere 'unilateral activ-
ity,' " discarded as jurisdictionally insignificant in Hanson. Id. at 298.
104. Id. at 297. The Court explained that requiring this form of foreseeability for due
process allows a person to arrange his activities so as to avoid liability for suit. Id.
105. Id. at 297-98.
106. Id. Justice Brennan dissented. Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He would have
given greater weight to the forum state's interest in the matter, as well as to the actual incon-
venience to the defendant. Justice Brennan considered Oklahoma a suitable forum in this case
because the accident occurred in Oklahoma, the key witnesses and evidence were there, and
Oklahoma had an interest in enforcing its traffic laws. Id. at 305. He found the distinction
between a product that reaches the forum state through independent middlemen and one that
is brought there by a consumer unrealistic. Id. at 306-07. In his view, a car dealer intends that
its customers use the cars it sells for interstate travel. Id. at 306. Justice Brennan reiterated
his assertion in Shaffer that jurisdiction should be based on the contacts between the parties,
the forum, and the litigation. Id. at 310. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
Justice Marshall dissented in a separate opinion. Id. at 313 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He
would have interpreted the defendants' contacts more broadly, basing jurisdiction on the de-
fendants' participation in a "nationwide, indeed a global, network for marketing and servicing
automobiles." Id. at 314. To him, a car distributor and retailer should be able to anticipate
that the cars they sell will travel to states beyond their sales districts, and thus, that they will
be called into court for injury caused there by defects in those cars. Id. at 314-15.
In a third dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun cautioned that the majority's decision would
lead to "passing on every variant in the myriad of motor vehicle fact situations" to determine
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Dicta in Kulko and World- Wide Volkswagen thus indicated that the Court
would approve the foreseeability theory of the effects test, at least so far as
the defendant derived commercial benefit from its acts or caused physical
injury. Because neither case involved intent to cause an effect, the Court
made no statement about that theory.
II. APPLICATION OF DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLES
TO NONRESIDENT PUBLISHERS
A. Decisions Prior to International Shoe
Prior to International Shoe the doing business test was the only means of
asserting jurisdiction over out-of-state publishers.° 7 Courts focused on the
business activities of the publisher in the forum state: whether it was in-
volved directly in the sale of its publications, whether it solicited and ac-
cepted subscriptions, and whether it entered into contracts or received
payments there. Nevertheless, publishers rarely were amenable to suit under
this test because few of them performed any of these activities outside their
states of incorporation or principal place of business.
The major bar to jurisdiction over nonresident publishers was the trade
practice of contracting with independent parties to distribute the publica-
tions after they left the printer.108 These contracts usually gave the distribu-
tor title to the publications at the time it received them. After taking
possession, the distributors disseminated the publications to newsstands and
subscribers in the various states.109
Because the distributors were not agents of the publisher, the publisher
could not be bound through their activities, 1 o even if the activities were to
the publisher's benefit. 1 Similarly, when the distributors were wholly-
owned subsidiaries, their independent organization and legal status shielded
whether the defendant had a sufficient contact with the forum state. Id. at 319 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
For a discussion of World- Wide Volkswagen, see Louis, supra note 78.
107. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text. Because publishers are corporations
rather than natural persons, they are governed by the jurisdictional rules for businesses.
108. See, e.g., Street & Smith Publication v. Spikes, 120 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1941); Cannon
v. Time, Inc., 115 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1940); Whitaker v. MacFadden Publications, 105 F.2d 44
(D.C. Cir. 1939); Kriger v. MacFadden Publications, 38 F. Supp. 472 (D. Md. 1941); Reed v.
Real Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945), Lee v. Memphis Publishing
Co., 195 Miss. 264, 14 So. 2d 351 (1943).
109. See, e.g., Street & Smith Publications v. Spikes, 120 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1941); Cannon
v. Time, Inc., 115 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1940).
110. See Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945).
111. Cannon v. Time, Inc., 115 F.2d at 425 (no jurisdiction even though the distributor
collected subscription applications for the publisher).
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the parent company from jurisdiction.1 12 In the few cases in which jurisdic-
tion was upheld, the publisher either had disseminated news in the forum
state through its news service,1 13 had retained title to the publications after
they had arrived in the forum state, 114 or had controlled distribution
there.115 The amount of circulation was not significant by itself.
If jurisdiction could not be based on distribution, courts looked for other
activities the publisher conducted in the state. Frequently publishers did
maintain offices in states to promote sales, to solicit advertising, and to
gather news. For the most part, however, courts did not consider these ac-
tivities sufficient to satisfy the doing business requirement. Sales promotion
and advertising solicitation were not enough by themselves for jurisdiction
unless the employees in the forum state had power to make binding con-
tracts or to collect money for the publisher.116 These responsibilities usually
were retained by the home office out of state.
Although at least one court considered newsgathering a jurisdictionally
significant activity,117 others, most notably the United States Court of Ap-
peals of the District of Columbia, declined to consider newsgathering in the
112. See Moorhead v. Curtis Publishing Co., 43 F. Supp. 67 (W.D. Ky. 1942); Creager v.
P.F. Collier & Son Co., 36 F.2d 783 (S.D. Tex. 1929). In Moorhead, the parent and the subsid-
iary shared the same name, officers, directors, and office building, but were incorporated in
different states, maintained separate records and books, were staffed by different employees,
and performed different functions. The court concluded that jurisdiction did not lie because
they were separate legal entities.
113. See Ricketts v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 27 App. D.C. 222 (1906). The pub-
lisher of the New York Sun maintained an office in the District of Columbia through which it
furnished daily news reports to other newspapers.
114. See Clements v. MacFadden Publications, 28 F. Supp. 274 (E.D. Tex. 1939). An
agreement between the publisher and its agent stipulated that the publisher would retain title
to the magazines it shipped. The court found that the publisher was thus a property holder in
the state through its magazines.
115. See Acton v. Washington Times Co., 9 F. Supp. 74 (D. Md. 1934). A Washington,
D.C., publisher maintained six distribution stations in nearby Maryland to which it delivered
its newspapers. These stations were supervised by managers on its payroll. Distributors and
supervisors were accountable to the publisher's main office in Washington, D.C.
116. See Whitaker v. MacFadden Publications, 105 F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (no jurisdic-
tion over a publisher that had five sales promoters stationed in the District of Columbia be-
cause the promoters did not solicit advertising or subscriptions, nor did they collect money);
Kriger v. MacFadden Publications, 38 F. Supp. 472 (D. Md. 1941) (no jurisdiction for the
same reasons as in Whitaker, as well as the employees' lack of power to contract); Lauricella v.
Evening News Publishing Co., 15 F. Supp. 671 (E.D.N.Y. 1936) (no jurisdiction over a New
Jersey newspaper that maintained an office in New York to solicit advertising because only the
New Jersey office could approve orders and bill advertisers); Merrimon v. Martindale-Hubbell,
Inc., 36 F. Supp. 182 (E.D.S.C. 1940) (no jurisdiction when the only in-state activity was
solicitation of subscribers).
117. See Acton v. Washington Times Co., 9 F. Supp. 74 (D. Md. 1934) (calling news-
gathering one of the essential functions of the newspaper business).
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jurisdictional analysis. 11 8 The court concluded that mere newsgathering,
like mere solicitation, did not amount to doing business. It reasoned that
because most major newspapers maintained offices in Washington, D.C., to
report on the national government, subjecting them to jurisdiction for this
activity could affect the reporting of news to their home districts. 19
B. Early Interpretations of the Minimum Contacts Test
1. Influence of the Doing Business Test
International Shoe's announcement of the minimum contacts test had lit-
tle immediate effect on jurisdiction over nonresident publishers. Due pro-
cess did not require states to extend their statutory jurisdiction to the
constitutional limit.12 Thus, cases could be decided on existing, more re-
strictive grounds. Because most cases against nonresident publishers were
heard in federal courts, state courts had little opportunity to decide whether
to accept the doctrine of International Shoe. Federal courts hesitated to dis-
card doing business concepts in the absence of state court decisions or clear
legislative intent.1 21 When state legislatures did revise their statutes, they
often retained "doing business" language. Courts construing the revised
statutes often concluded they were not intended to reach to the limits of due
process. 122 Finally, some courts explicitly chose to adhere to earlier rulings.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, for
example, has continued to follow the newsgathering exception created to
118. See Layne v. Tribune Co., 71 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Neely v. Philadelphia In-
quirer Co., 62 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1932); Lee v. Memphis Publishing Co., 195 Miss. 264, 14
So. 2d 351 (1943).
119. Layne, 71 F.2d at 224; Neely, 62 F.2d at 875. The court did not make clear whether
its conclusion was based on the doing business theory, the commerce clause, or some wholly
new rationale, such as the first amendment.
120. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 440 (1952); Missouri Pac.
R.R. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co., 257 U.S. 533, 535 (1922); Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l,
320 F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 1963). See also Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 998-1008.
Courts must decide whether the publisher's contacts are within the ambit of the state's statute
as well as the due process clause. A state may require more contacts than are needed for due
process but it may not allow less.
121. See Walker v. Savell, 335 F.2d 536, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1964) (no jurisdiction in Missis-
sippi over the Associated Press); Schmidt v. Esquire, Inc., 210 F.2d 908, 915-16 (7th Cir.) (no
jurisdiction in Indiana over the publishers of Esquire Magazine and Reader's Digest), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 819 (1954); Perna v. Dell Publishing Co., 240 F. Supp. 268, 269 (D. Mass.
1964) (no jurisdiction over the publisher of Front Page Detective). See also Brewster v. Boston
Herald-Traveler Corp., 141 F. Supp. 760, 763 (D. Me. 1956) (no jurisdiction over a Boston
newspaper publisher).
122. See Polizzi v. Cowles Magazine, Inc., 197 F.2d 74, 77 (5th Cir. 1952) (no jurisdiction
in Florida over the publisher of Look Magazine), rev'd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 663 (1953);
Sonnier v. Time, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 576, 580 (W.D. La. 1959) (no jurisdiction over the pub-
lisher of Time, Life, Sports Illustrated, Fortune, and House and Home magazines).
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protect newspapers that station permanent correspondents in Washington,
D.C. 123
At first, courts that chose to follow International Shoe were influenced by
doing business concepts. They continued to focus on whether the publisher
maintained an office, telephone listing, bank account, or agent in the state;
whether it owned property or held its board meetings there; and whether it
was authorized to do business in the state. 124 Central to these inquiries was
the notion that the publisher must have performed some act in the state for
jurisdiction. The publisher's circulation of its publication in the forum state,
its greatest potential contact and the one from which defamation arises, was
generally ignored, as it had been under the doing business test, because dis-
tribution in the state was carried out by independent contractors. 25 Doing
business arguments that the publisher had relinquished title and control over
123. See Founding Church of Scientology v. Verlag, 536 F.2d 429, 433-34 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Margoles v. Johns, 483 F.2d 1212, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Bulletin Co. v. Origoni, 387 F.2d
240, 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 928 (1967).
On the other hand, some courts did find they could assert jurisdiction under a straight doing
business test. In Brandon v. Memphis Publishing Co., 194 F. Supp. 376, 377 (E.D. Ark.
1961), a Tennessee publisher had circulated two daily newspapers in nearby Arkansas, with an
average Arkansas circulation of 21,084 daily and 30,249 Sunday newspapers. Id. at 377.
Although most circulation was carried out by independent contractors, four of the publisher's
employees regularly promoted circulation in Arkansas. In addition, the publisher maintained
two offices in Arkansas to gather news. Id. The court granted jurisdiction on a "solicitation
plus" theory emphasizing that the news report on which the claim was based originated in
Arkansas. Id.
In contrast, the Mississippi Supreme Court, prior to International Shoe, had denied jurisdic-
tion over the same publisher on similar facts. Lee v. Memphis Publishing Co., 195 Miss. 264,
283, 14 So. 2d 351, 355 (1943). At that time the publisher maintained an office in Jackson,
Mississippi to gather news. Id. at 276, 14 So. 2d at 352. It also sent 40,000 copies of its
newspaper into the state daily. Id. at 283, 14 So. 2d at 355. Mississippi refused jurisdiction,
however, because the newspapers were brought into the state by an independent contractor,
and the court considered the act of newsgathering jurisdictionally insignificant. Id. at 279-83,
14 So. 2d at 353-55.
In another post-International Shoe case, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma resolved the ques-
tion of jurisdiction over a publisher that distributed its magazine through an independent con-
tractor by focusing on which party had practical control over the magazine, rather than which
party had title. Fawcett Publications v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42 (Okla. 1962), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 513 (1964). The court found that the publisher had discretion over the number of copies
it sent; it could dictate promotional activities to the distributor; it could increase or decrease
the distributor's territory at will; and it could cancel the contract with ten days notice and
without cause. Id. at 46. Reasoning that the distributor was little more than a conduit for the
publisher, the court upheld jurisdiction. Id.
124. See, e.g., Breckenridge v. Time, Inc., 253 Miss. 835, 839-40, 179 So. 2d 781, 782-83
(1965).
125. One court acknowledged the paradox by observing that:
Circulation is the source of life to the magazine publisher. Not only are readers a
source of revenue, but their number is an important factor in attracting advertising
and determining rates therefor. . . . [D]istributors. . . are but the conduit between
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the publications outside the forum state frequently prevailed. 26
Several early courts did find ways to assert jurisdiction without focusing
directly on circulation. Some resorted to a functional analysis. They consid-
ered whether the publisher had carried out any of its essential operating
functions-gathering news, soliciting advertising, or printing and circulating
its publications-in the forum state.127 Having its publication printed in the
state was enough to bring a publisher into court; such activity not only was
continuous but was part of the process of publishing a libel.128 Likewise,
maintaining a resident employee to write features, promote circulation, and
solicit advertising in the state could bring the publisher within the court's
jurisdiction, particularly when the edition in question was directed solely to
that state.1
29
Other courts, by analyzing the relationship between the publisher and its
distributor, found the publisher sufficiently involved in distribution to be
amenable to suit. One court held a publisher subject to suit for employing
eight persons to act as liaisons with its distributor and to travel throughout
the state promoting circulation.13 ' This court reasoned that promotional
activity was sufficiently connected to the publication of a defamation for it to
grant jurisdiction. 13' Another court determined that if a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary acted as an agent for its parent organization, contacts of the subsidi-
ary could be imputed to the parent.' 3 2 It found that the parent company in
the publisher and the reader, and they certainly establish contacts that are essential
to the very existence of [the] defendant.
Sonnier v. Time, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 576, 579 (W.D. La. 1959). The court in Sonnier denied
jurisdiction, however, because of a restrictive state statute. Id. at 580.
126. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Fawcett Publications, 204 F. Supp. 361, 364 (N.D. Fla. 1962);
Fawcett Publications v. Rand, 144 So. 2d 512, 513 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (no jurisdiction
in Florida over the publisher of Startling Detective Magazine); Putnam v. Triangle Publica-
tions, 245 N.C. 432, 434-38, 96 S.E.2d 445, 447-50 (1957) (no jurisdiction in North Carolina
over the publisher of Official Detective Stories, Seventeen, and TV Guide).
127. The first publishing case to use a functional approach was Acton v. Washington Times
Co., 9 F. Supp. 74 (D. Md. 1934), decided prior to International Shoe. The Acton court rea-
soned that "[i]f a foreign corporation sees fit to perform any one of these functions in a given
jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that such performance raises the inference that the corpora-
tion is present and doing business within the jurisdiction." Id. at 76.
128. LaBonte v. American Mercury Magazine, Inc., 98 N.H. 163, 167-68, 96 A.2d 200,
203 (1953); Consolidated Cosmetics v. D-A Publishing Co., 186 F.2d 906, 908 (7th Cir. 1951).
129. Hunter v. Afro-American Co., 133 F. Supp. 812, 820 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
130. Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 130 F. Supp. 104, 107, afid on rehearing, 132 F. Supp.
556 (W.D. Pa. 1955), dismissed on other grounds, 143 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
131. Id. at 106-07. Compare Jenkins with Whitaker v. MacFadden Publications, 105 F.2d
44 (D.C. Cir. 1939), and Kriger v. MacFadden Publications, 38 F. Supp. 472 (D. Md. 1941)
(jurisdiction in both cases denied on similar facts under the doing business theory prior to
International Shoe). See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
132. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Cassel, 302 F.2d 132, 137 (10th Cir. 1962). The United
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question-by giving its wholly-owned distributor credit for unsold copies, by
paying it commissions on subscriptions received, and by reimbursing it for
promotional activities-had borne the risks of distribution, and as such, was
liable to suit in the forum state.' 33
Nevertheless, some courts were reluctant to explore ways to expand their
jurisdiction. Even after McGee they continued to read International Shoe
narrowly, as requiring the publisher to have performed a continuous and
substantial amount of activity in the forum state. One court denied jurisdic-
tion over the syndicator of a newspaper column that had been published for
ten years in one of the forum state's newspapers.'3 4  Ignoring McGee, the
court found the syndicator's act of contracting with the newspaper to pub-
lish the column too casual for jurisdiction. 3  Another court refused juris-
diction over the publisher of Life Magazine. 136  It interpreted Hanson as
requiring the defendant to have physically transacted business in the forum
state. 7 Because the publisher had contracted with independent parties to
gather news, to distribute its magazines, and to solicit subscriptions in the
state, the only activity its staff members conducted there was occasional so-
licitation of advertising. 3' The court considered this activity too inconse-
quential for jurisdiction. 39
As these cases illustrate, courts that focused on the business activity of
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit observed that the Supreme Court in Cannon
Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 335 (1925), had placed importance on the
agency relationship between a parent and its subsidiary.
133. Id. at 137-38. Compare Cassel with Moorhead v. Curtis Publishing Co., 43 F. Supp.
67 (D. Ky. 1942) (jurisdiction over the same publisher denied under the more stringent re-
quirements for doing business). See supra note 112.
134. Walker v. General Features Corp., 319 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1963).
135. Id. at 586. In a separate opinion the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit denied jurisdiction over the owner of the allegedly defamatory column. Walker v.
Field Enterprises, 332 F.2d 632 (10th Cir. 1964) (per curiam). This decision was based solely
on state law. Id. at 633.
136. Breckenridge v. Time, Inc., 253 Miss. 835, 179 So. 2d 781 (1965).
137. Id. at 844, 179 So. 2d at 784.
138. Id. at 840-41, 179 So. 2d at 782-83. The complaint alleged that the publisher entered
the forum state, took the defendant's picture, and published it in its magazine along with a
defamatory caption. Id. at 840, 179 So. 2d at 782. In fact, the photographer was an independ-
ent contractor who sold the picture to Time, Inc., outside the state. The article and caption
were written elsewhere, too. Id.
139. Id. at 844, 179 So. 2d at 784. In contrast the Supreme Court of Alabama allowed
jurisdiction over the New York Times even though it used independent contractors for much
of its in-state work. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962), rev'd
on other grounds, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan, the New York Times had no staff stationed
in Alabama but did have contracts with at least two Alabama residents to write occasional
stories as string correspondents. The Times used one of these "stringers" to investigate the
libel alleged by Sullivan. The Supreme Court of Alabama determined that these stringers were
effectively agents of the Times. Id. at 669, 144 So. 2d at 33. The Times also solicited advertis-
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publishers remained bound by earlier jurisdictional concepts. Only with the
development of a theory basing jurisdiction on tortious activity were courts
able to build a new framework for jurisdiction over publishers.
2. Defamation as a Tortious Contact
Prior to International Shoe, a corporation could not be summoned to
court for having committed a tort in the state. The only jurisdictional basis
available was doing business."4 International Shoe incorporated the tort
theory of jurisdiction, which previously had applied only to individuals be-
ing sued for tortious driving, into the minimum contacts scheme.' The
tort basis of jurisdiction thus was broadened to cover all torts, including that
of defamation. At the same time, states gained a means of exercising juris-
diction over corporations that had committed torts in the state but whose
activity there amounted to less than "doing business." '142
Once due process clearly allowed jurisdiction over a corporation for com-
mitting a tort, states began to amend their statutes to allow jurisdiction for
all forms of tortious conduct. Two basic types of long-arm tort statutes were
developed. On the one hand, several states enacted provisions requiring "the
commission of a tortious act" in the state143 or "the corprirrsion of a tort in
whole or in part" there.'" On the other hand, some states, and the Uniform
Interstate and International Procedure Act, 4 ' allow jurisdiction only for in-
ing in Alabama and sent its newspapers into the state. Relying on McGee, the court concluded
that these activities were sufficient for jurisdiction. Id.
140. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
141. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). The Court used the
nonresident motorist cases of Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), and Kane v. New Jersey,
242 U.S. 160 (1916), as examples of single acts which by their nature and quality were suffi-
cient to confer jurisdiction under the minimum contacts test.
142. See generally Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of
Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. REv. 249 (1959).
143. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-209(a) (Smith-Hurd 1980). This act provides
that:
(a) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or
through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such
person, and, if an individual, his or her personal representative, to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any such
acts:
(2) The commission of a tortious act within this State.
Id. Illinois was one of the first states to enact a comprehensive long-arm statute. Other states
have adopted the language of the Illinois statute. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-16
(Michie 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-214(2) (Michie 1980). For a discussion of the Illi-
nois statute and its interpretation, see Currie, supra note 14; Cleary & Seder, supra note 43.
144. See, e.g., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031(b) § 4 (Vernon 1964).
145. 13 U.L.A. 459 (1980).
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jury caused by an act in the state or for injury caused by an act outside the
state, as long as the defendant engages in business or in any other persistent
conduct within the state. 146 These statutes were intended to be construed
more narrowly than the tortious act statutes to obviate any due process
concerns. 
147
Initially, courts construed all the new tort provisions narrowly. In Put-
nam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 148 the Supreme Court of North Carolina
held that the state's statute, which required "tortious conduct" in the state
for jurisdiction, could not be applied constitutionally to the facts of the
case.149 The court found that Triangle Publications had not entered North
Carolina either personally or through its chattels because it had consigned
its magazines to independent distributors, who brought them into the state.
Without conducting any activity in the state, Triangle Publications was not
subject to jurisdiction."°
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit took another
approach in Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp. 5' In Insull, an Illi-
nois resident sued the Scripps-Howard newspapers in Illinois. These news-
papers, incorporated and published in cities outside Illinois, had very limited
circulation in the state. 5 ' The plaintiff argued that the defendant's sale of
the newspapers in Illinois completed a tort commenced elsewhere. As the
last event necessary for liability, the sale of the newspapers was part of the
146. Section 1.03 of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act provides that:
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or
by an agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for reliefi arising from the person's
(3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside the state if he
regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered, in this state.
UNIF. INTERSTATE AND INT'L PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03, 13 U.L.A. 466 (1980 & Supp. 1985).
See Margoles v. Johns, 483 F.2d 1212, 1216-17 (D.C. Cir. 1973), for an explanation of the
District of Columbia statute and for a discussion of long-arm tort provisions generally.
147. UNIF. INTERSTATE AND INT'L PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03(a)(3)-(a)(4), 13 U.L.A. 468-
69 (1980 & Supp. 1985), commissioner's comment.
148. 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957).
149. Id. at 443, 96 S.E.2d at 455.
150. Id. at 444, 96 S.E.2d at 454-55. The court made a similar argument in denying juris-
diction under the distribution of goods provision of the North Carolina long-arm statute. Id.
at 454. See supra note 126.
151. 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 942 (1960).
152. Id. at 169. The New York World-Telegram circulated 37 papers in Illinois daily. The
other Scripps-Howard newspapers circulated even fewer. As in Putnam, the court rejected
jurisdiction under the doing business theory because the newspapers were delivered into Illi-
nois by mail and by independent contractors.
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"tortious act" required by the Illinois statute. 53 The Seventh Circuit re-
jected this argument and held that in cases of multistate publication, the
cause of action is complete where the communication is first published.
54
In this case, the newspapers were first published outside Illinois. The Sev-
enth Circuit concluded that the tortious act occurred there, not in Illinois. 5
Other courts criticized Putnam and Insull.156 Both cases now appear to
have been overruled.' 5 7 The major turning point in interpreting "tortious
act" provisions came with the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. 58 In Gray, an Illi-
nois resident had been injured in Illinois in a hot water heater explosion,
caused by a faulty valve manufactured in Ohio and installed in the heater in
153. Id. at 171. Plaintiff's argument was based on the last event doctrine. See RESTATE-
MENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
154. 273 F.2d at 171. The court based its argument on the single publication rule. See
supra note 22. In this case, the court used the single publication rule to determine a single
place for the commission of the tort.
155. 273 F.2d at 171.
156. Putnam was rejected in Johnston v. Time, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 837 (M.D.N.C. 1970),
modified on other grounds, 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971). Courts that have rejected the Insull
approach include Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1978); Anselmi v.
Denver Post, Inc., 552 F.2d 316 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 911 (1977); Buckley v. New
York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967); Blount v. T D Publishing Co., 77 N.M. 392, 423
P.2d 426 (1966); Roy v. North Am. Newpaper Alliance, Inc., 106 N.H. 92, 205 A.2d 844
(1964). See also Process Church of the Final Judgment v. Sanders, 338 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D.
Ill. 1972); Novel v. Garrison, 294 F. Supp. 825 (N.D. Ill. 1969); McGuire v. Brightman, 79
Cal. App. 3d 776, 145 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1978).
For commentators rejecting Putnam, see Note, Foreign Corporations-Jurisdiction-State
Statute Asserting Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations Held Unconstitutional As Applied to
Defendant-Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 71 HARv. L. REV. 554 (1958); Note, Cor-
porations-Jurisdiction-"Doing Business", 26 FORDHAM L. REV. 342 (1957). See also Note,
Service of Process-Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 35 N.C.L. REV. 546 (1957). For
commentators rejecting Insull, see Currie, supra note 14; Comment, Newspaper Libel: Barriers
to Expanding Personal Jurisdiction, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 569 (1962).
157. In Johnston v. Time, Inc., the United States District Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina concluded that the Supreme Court of North Carolina had overruled Putnam
by its subsequent decision in Painter v. Home Finance Co., 245 N.C. 576, 96 S.E.2d 731
(1957). Johnston, 321 F. Supp. at 842. The federal court was quick to note, however, that the
North Carolina contacts of Time, Inc., greatly exceeded those of Triangle Publications in Put-
nam. Not only did Time have over 200,000 subscribers in North Carolina to four of its
magazines, it owned property in the state and sold advertising to North Carolina businesses.
Id. at 841.
In Process Church of the Final Judgment v. Sanders, 338 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Ill. 1972), the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois concluded that Insull was
overruled by the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). See infra notes 158-62 and
accompanying text.
158. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
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Pennsylvania.' 5 9 The Illinois court determined it could not separate the
negligence in manufacturing the valve from the injury it had caused."60 The
court reasoned that injury was a necessary component of a tortious act. It
accepted the last event argument rejected by Insull, stating that the place of
the wrong is where the last event necessary for liability occurs. 16 1 Because
the injury occurred in Illinois, suit in Illinois was proper. 162
Courts in states that have "tortious act" statutes like that of Illinois gener-
ally have accepted Gray, as has the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, which has held that it overrules Insull.163 In
contrast, courts applying "act in state" statutes have interpreted them more
narrowly than the Illinois statute." 4 They usually require that the defend-
ant commit the causative act within the bounds of the state before they will
assert jurisdiction. 165 Thus, only those publishers who have written, printed,
mailed, or personally distributed the publication in the forum state may be
subject to suit under one of these provisions. On the other hand, some
courts have been fairly liberal in applying the companion provisions that
allow jurisdiction for an act occurring elsewhere as long as the defendant has
engaged in business activity within the forum state.16 6 These courts have
asserted jurisdiction over publishers for out-of-state publication even when
the publishers' in-state business activity is relatively minor. 
167
159. Id. at 434, 438, 176 N.E.2d at 762, 764.
160. Id. at 436, 176 N.E.2d at 763.
161. Id. at 435-40, 176 N.E.2d at 762-65.
162. Id. at 444, 176 N.E.2d at 767.
163. See Process Church of the Final Judgment v. Sanders, 338 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Ill.
1972). See also Novel v. Garrison, 294 F. Supp. 825 (N.D. Ill. 1969). In Process Church, the
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held a Louisiana book publisher and a New
York author subject to jurisdiction in Illinois for distributing their book in that state. The
court, in addition to finding that Gray's acceptance of the last event doctrine conflicted with
Insull, noted that Illinois had adopted the Uniform Single Publication Act. 338 F. Supp. at
1399-1400. The Uniform Act does not restrict the place where an action may be brought.
UNIF. SINGLE PUBLICATION AcT, 14 U.L.A. 351 (1980).
164. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text. One court, recognizing that the state
statute would not allow jurisdiction over the defendants for mailing defamatory letters into the
state, disregarded the statute and asserted jurisdiction as consistent with due process, relying
on Gray for its holding. St. Clair v. Righter, 250 F. Supp. 148, 153, 155 (W.D. Va. 1966).
165. For example, in Margoles v. Johns, 483 F.2d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied jurisdiction over a defendant who
had made a defamatory telephone call from Wisconsin to the plaintiff in Washington, D.C. Id.
at 1213. The plaintiff argued that the defendant had acted in the District of Columbia by
projecting her presence through the device of the telephone. Id. at 1217. The court rejected
this argument. It concluded that, according to the plain language of the District's statute, the
"act" must be considered separately from its consequences. Thus, the act of uttering the state-
ments took place in Wisconsin, not in the District of Columbia. Id. at 1218.
166. See supra note 146.
167. See Founding Church of Scientology v. Verlag, 536 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In
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3. The Stream of Commerce Theory and a Balancing of Interests
In addition to defining how "tortious act" provisions of long-arm statutes
should be interpreted, Gray introduced the "stream of commerce" theory.
Under this theory, if a corporation chooses to market its products for ulti-
mate use in the forum state, the forum is justified in exercising jurisdiction
over claims of injury caused by those products.' 68 Shipment into the state
by an independent middleman is immaterial because the manufacturer de-
rives a benefit from the state that is essential to its business. 69 The stream of
commerce theory combines elements of both the doing business and tort the-
ories of jurisdiction. It draws from McGee the concept that a defendant can
be subject to jurisdiction for an extraterritorial act. It justifies jurisdiction on
the ground that by including the forum state within its market, the defend-
ant enjoys the benefits and protections of its laws, as required by Hanson.
The stream of commerce theory provided a mechanism to assert jurisdic-
tion over publishers who used the mails or independent contractors for dis-
tribution or who rarely were present in the forum state. During the 1960's
several courts did accept this rationale. The first to use it was Roy v. North
American Newspaper Alliance, Inc. 170 Roy concerned a distributor of syndi-
cated columns. Although the syndicator in Roy distributed its features di-
rectly to newspapers in New Hampshire without resort to a middleman, it
rarely entered the state itself. 71  The Supreme Court of New Hampshire
upheld jurisdiction, reasoning that a publisher should be treated no differ-
ently than a product manufacturer; both purposefully had caused their prod-
ucts to be marketed in the forum state even though they had not been
present there.172 The court found that New Hampshire had an interest in
Verlag, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that, in
addition to circulating 56 copies of the allegedly defamatory magazine in the District of Co-
lumbia, the publisher had received $26,000 in revenue from its sales there during a 10-month
period, an amount equal to about 1% of its total revenues. Id. at 431-33. This amount,
although not great, was sufficient to meet the statute's "substantial revenue" standard for sup-
porting business activity, and thus, to bring the publisher within the court's jurisdiction. Id. at
433. The substantial revenue test, also used in Maryland and Virginia, considers both the
absolute amount and percentage of total sales to determine whether contacts are sufficient for
jurisdiction. Id.
See also Akbar v. New York Magazine Co., 490 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1980) (allowing juris-
diction over a New York publisher with annual sales in the District of Columbia of only
$32,897, an amount equal to 0.7% of its total circulation revenues).
168. "[I]f a corporation elects to sell its products for ultimate use in another [s]tate, it is not
unjust to hold it answerable there for any damage caused by defects in those products." Gray,
22 Ill. 2d at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
169. Id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
170. 106 N.H. 92, 205 A.2d 844 (1964).
171. Id. at 95-96, 205 A.2d at 846.
172. Id. at 96, 205 A.2d at 847. Compare Roy with Walker v. General Features Corp., 319
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the litigation, that of protecting its citizens from defamation., 73 A publisher
could reasonably anticipate libel actions there from the distribution of its
publications.1 74 Weighing the equities and conveniences of trial in New
Hampshire, the court concluded that exercise of jurisdiction was fair because
New Hampshire's law would be applied to the matter; most of the crucial
witnesses lived there; and North American had derived benefit for years
from its sales in the state.
175
In Roy, there was no middleman between the syndicator and the newspa-
pers to which it sold its features. In Bibie v. T.D. Publishing Corp.,"76 the
publisher's magazines were shipped into the state by independent parties. In
accordance with Gray, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California upheld jurisdiction, finding that the publisher was
aware that over eleven percent of its magazines were destined for Califor-
nia. 7 7 The defendant had chosen to exploit that market and had derived
substantial revenue from sales there.'7  The court then balanced the inter-
ests of the plaintiff and the state against the inconvenience to the defendant
in standing trial and held that trial in California would be fair.179
The majority of courts now accept the stream of commerce theory. 8
Roy and Bibie demonstrate the general characteristics of cases decided under
this theory. Instead of searching for in-state activities attributable to the
F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1963) (jurisdiction over a syndicator denied because the court ignored the
syndicator's act of contracting to distribute the column). See supra notes 134-35 and accompa-
nying text.
173. 106 N.H. at 97, 205 A.2d at 847. The court noted that the choice of forum was not
motivated by forum-shopping because the plaintiff lived and worked there.
174. Id. at 97-98, 205 A.2d at 847. That North American did foresee libel actions was
shown by its contract with the column's author, Drew Pearson. The contract indemnified it
against liability from libel. Id.
175. Id. at 98, 205 A.2d at 848.
176. 252 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
177. Id. at 189.
178. Id. In addition to subscription and newsstand revenues, the publisher's magazines
carried $2,052 of advertising from California businesses. Id. at 187.
179. Id. at 188-89. The balancing factors the court considered were: the state's interest in
providing a forum for its residents; the availability of evidence and witnesses; the accessibility
of another forum; the desire to avoid multiple lawsuits; and the extent to which the cause of
action arose from local activity. Id. at 189. The court concluded that the plaintiff's interests
were established by her residence in the state, the location of her witnesses there, and the
difficulty she would have in bringing suit in New York, the defendant's state. Id. California
had an interest in the matter because the cause of action arose from the publisher's sales there,
the plaintiff was a resident, California was the real locus of injury, and California law would
apply. Id. at 190. These interests outweighed any inconvenience to the defendant who had
affirmatively chosen to market its magazines in California. Id. at 190-91.
180. Courts that do not accept the stream of commerce theory have restrictive doing busi-
ness or tort provisions in their long-arm statutes.
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publisher, as in cases decided under a pure doing business theory, courts
following the stream of commerce rationale look for distribution of the pub-
lication in the forum state and economic benefit to the publisher.'8 1 The
results are more consistent with International Shoe than the doing business
test because the basis for the cause of action, injury to reputation, is related
to the contact of circulating defamatory material.
As the United States Supreme Court did in McGee, courts following the
stream of commerce theory frequently balance interests to determine the
fairness of holding the trial in the state. Usually, courts have found that the
interests of the state and plaintiff outweigh the inconvenience to the defend-
ant. Nevertheless, the balancing factors have provided defendants a new
means to challenge jurisdiction. In one case, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Bird-
song,'82 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied ju-
risdiction because it found that the forum state, Alabama, had no interest in
the suit that it did not share with the forty-nine other states.'8 3 Neither the
plaintiff nor the publisher resided in the state. The majority ignored the fact
that the publisher had circulated almost 70,000 copies of its allegedly defam-
atory issue in Alabama. 84 Instead, it noted that most of the injury occurred
in Mississippi, where the plaintiff lived. The court concluded that if plain-
tiffs were allowed to sue in any state of their choosing, businesses operating
nationwide could be subjected to frivolous and harassing lawsuits through-
out the country. 185
C. Jurisdiction Over Publishers When Circulation Is Small
1. First Amendment Considerations
Once the publisher's act of sending its publications into the state was ac-
cepted as a jurisdictionally significant contact, the question shifted to the
point at which circulation becomes too inconsequential for the exercise of
181. But see Blount v. T D Publishing Corp., 77 N.M. 384, 423 P.2d 421 (1966) (court
concluded that by sending its magazines into the national stream of commerce the defendant
had submitted to the jurisdiction of all states in which its magazines caused injury, and thus,
did not balance the interests and conveniences of the parties).
182. 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966).
183. Id. at 347. The court found that no rational nexus existed between Alabama and the
parties, the injury to their reputations, or the subject matter of the allegedly defamatory article.
Id. at 346-47.
184. Id. at 347. The circulation of the Saturday Evening Post in Alabama at the time was
69,552 copies per issue. The court did not decide whether the circulation amounted to a con-
tact with the state. The concurring opinion by Judge Rives found that the circulation did
constitute a contact. Id. at 349 (Rives, J., concurring). Nevertheless, he agreed that due pro-
cess would not allow the court to exercise jurisdiction because Alabama had no legitimate
interest in the case. Id. at 353.
185. Id. at 347.
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jurisdiction. This issue has arisen most often when a newspaper dissemi-
nates only a handful of copies in a state distant from its principal place of
business.
After a series of cases brought in Southern states against the New York
Times during the civil rights unrest of the early 1960's, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in New York Times Co. v. Connor,
1 16
concluded that a "greater showing of contact" was needed for newspaper
publishers than for other types of businesses because of first amendment con-
siderations. 187 The New York Times had circulated an average of 395 daily
and 2,455 Sunday papers in Alabama, where Eugene Connor lived and
brought suit. 88 The Times' newsgathering and advertising activities in Ala-
bama were equally small. 89 These contacts were almost identical to the
Times' contacts with Louisiana in Buckley v. New York Times Co. 190 and its
contacts with Alabama in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 191 Although
both earlier cases had been decided on due process grounds, the Fifth Circuit
denied jurisdiction in Buckley,192 while the Supreme Court of Alabama al-
lowed it in Sullivan. 193 Further complicating the matter was the fact that
186. 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966). The jurisdictional issue in this case had been appealed
to the Fifth Circuit twice before. In New York Times Co. v. Conner [sic], 291 F.2d 492 (5th
Cir. 1961), the court denied jurisdiction on grounds similar to Insull. Id. at 494. After the
Supreme Court of Alabama ruled that it did have jurisdiction over the Times in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962), and expressed disapproval of Con-
ner, the Fifth Circuit vacated its decision. Connor v. New York Times Co., 310 F.2d 133 (5th
Cir. 1962). Both cases concerned the same contacts. The Fifth Circuit allowed the case to go
forward, but reserved hearing on the due process question until trial had been conducted on
the merits. 310 F.2d at 135. The instant case was brought after trial on the merits.
187. 365 F.2d at 572. Such a policy was suggested in two earlier Fifth Circuit cases. In
Walker v. Savell, 335 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1964), the court speculated that Mississippi courts
might require a higher standard of doing business for publishers than for other commercial
corporations because of a threat to the freedom of the press. Id. at 544. In Buckley v. New
York Times Co., 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964) (Brown, J., dissenting), the dissent would have
granted jurisdiction over the New York Times for contacts almost identical to those in Connor
unless first amendment policies precluded it. Id. at 476.
188. 365 F.2d at 570.
189. Id. Staff reporters had visited Alabama on seven occasions between April 1, 1959 and
August 22, 1960. Occasionally, the Times bought stories from independent correspondents, or
"stringers," living in Alabama. During the same period, Times' employees had traveled to
Alabama five times to solicit advertising. Only 0.025% to 0.046% of the Times' total advertis-
ing revenue came from Alabama.
190. 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964).
191. 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
192. 338 F.2d at 474-75. Jurisdiction was denied on the grounds that mere circulation of a
periodical, even though accompanied by sporadic newsgathering and solicitation of a small
amount of advertising, did not constitute doing business.
193. 273 Ala. at 670-71, 144 So. 2d at 34-35. Jurisdiction was upheld on the grounds that
the Times conducted the activities of a publisher to a substantial degree in Alabama, and the
cause of action, defamation in an advertisement printed in the newspaper, although not solic-
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the Fifth Circuit previously had asserted jurisdiction over a foreign manufac-
turer for a single tort committed in Alabama.194 If the Fifth Circuit allowed
jurisdiction for a single act of defamation, circulation of a single copy of a
newspaper in the state would suffice. A newspaper publisher, faced with the
threat of suit in a distant forum and at the hands of a hostile local jury,
might cease to circulate there at all if the cost of defending the suit out-
weighed the publisher's gain from sales. Readers in the forum state would
be deprived of the newspaper's point of view. To protect the free flow of
ideas, the Fifth Circuit decided that the first amendment required a greater
showing of contacts for publishers. 95 Jurisdiction in Connor was denied.
Using the first amendment in the jurisdictional analysis went beyond pre-
vious Supreme Court rulings. In subsequent decisions, the Fifth Circuit
made clear that its test would not always bar jurisdiction over publishers. In
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino,19 6 the Fifth Circuit allowed jurisdiction in
Louisiana over the publisher of the Saturday Evening Post, which circulated
less than one percent of its total circulation in that state. The Court distin-
guished between the business orientation and motivations of newspaper pub-
lishers and those of magazine publishers. It concluded that, unlike a
newspaper publisher, which caters primarily to a local market, a magazine
publisher like Curtis actively seeks a national market.' 97 The court reasoned
that although a newspaper might curtail its circulation in a distant market if
confronted with suit there, a national magazine publisher would be unlikely
to take the same action.'98 Circulation of the Saturday Evening Post in Lou-
isiana, although only a small percentage of its total circulation, amounted to
60,000 copies per issue.' 99 The Fifth Circuit concluded that Curtis Publish-
ing would not curtail its circulation in Louisiana to avoid having to appear
ited, related to those activities. In contrast to the facts ascertained in Connor, 365 F.2d at 570,
the Alabama court found that Times correspondents had spent a total of 153 days in Alabama
gathering news between 1956 and 1960. 273 Ala. at 665, 144 So. 2d at 29. See supra note 189.
The Times maintained an ongoing contract with a stringer in Montgomery, Alabama, and
sought to have two other stringers as well. Id. From January to May 1960, the Times received
$17,000 to $18,000 of advertising from Alabama. Id. at 666, 144 So. 2d at 30.
194. Elkhart Eng'g Corp. v. Dornier Werke, 343 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965) (jurisidction
allowed in Alabama over a foreign aircraft manufacturer for a single airplane crash in the
state).
195. 365 F.2d at 572-73.
196. 383 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967). By the time of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Golino,
Louisiana had revised its statute to reach to the full extent of due process. Cf Sonnier v.
Time, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. La. 1959) (no jurisdiction over a major publisher under the
former, more restrictive statute). See supra note 122.
197. Golino, 383 F.2d at 590.
198. Id. at 592.
199. Id. at 588.
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in court there.2°
Similarly, first amendment considerations did not prohibit jurisdiction
over a wire service that had aimed its allegedly libelous report exclusively at
the forum state. In Edwards v. Associated Press,2 ' the Fifth Circuit found
that the Associated Press, by permanently stationing five correspondents in
Mississippi and by beaming its reports continuously into the state, enjoyed
the benefits and protections of Mississippi's laws.2 ° 2 Accordingly, the court
concluded that these contacts greatly exceeded those of the New York Times
in Connor.20
3
In Rebozo v. Washington Post Co. ,2" the Fifth Circuit held that a newspa-
per's substantial activities in the forum state made jurisdiction fair despite its
limited circulation there. The court found that the Washington Post derived
significant economic benefit from its activities in Florida; not only did it own
fifty percent of a news service that distributed stories to Florida newspapers,
including the story about Rebozo, it also owned Newsweek Magazine and
two Florida television stations.2 °5 Furthermore, Post reporters spent a con-
siderable amount of time gathering news in Florida, and $42,000 of the
newspaper's advertising revenue came from the state.2 °6 In contrast to Con-
nor, the Post's Florida activities were substantial enough to dispel fears of a
"chilling effect" on circulation.2 °7
Despite these exceptions, the Fifth Circuit has continued to deny jurisdic-
tion on first amendment grounds when a newspaper's circulation and other
activities have been minimal.2 °8 In contrast, commentators and other courts
200. Accord David v. National Lampoon, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 1097, 1098 (D.S.C. 1977).
Both the Golino and David courts realized that despite a small in-state percentage of total
circulation, the actual number of copies circulated could be quite large.
201. 512 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1975).
202. Id. at 267. In Walker v. Savell, 335 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1964), the Fifth Circuit had
held, on identical facts, that the Associated Press was not doing business under the former
Mississippi statute. After that decision, Mississippi revised its statute. Edwards was decided
under the new Mississippi tort provision. 512 F. 2d at 260.
203. 512 F.2d at 268.
204. 515 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1975). Rebozo was brought under the tort provision of Flor-
ida's newly revised long-arm statute. Cf Jenkins v. Fawcett Publications, 204 F. Supp. 361
(N.D. Fla. 1962); Fawcett Publications v. Rand, 144 So. 2d (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (juris-
diction denied under Florida's former statute, which required that a corporation be involved in
a business venture in Florida).
205. 515 F.2d at 1210.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1215-16.
208. See Wolfson v. Houston Post Co., 441 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (no
jurisdiction in Florida over a Texas newspaper when its yearly circulation of between 10,000
and 11,000 copies amounted to approximately 0.15% of its total circulation); McBride v.
Owens, 454 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (no jurisdiction in Texas over newspapers published
in Florida, New York, and Colorado because, although their very limited circulation met the
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did not readily accept the first amendment rule.2 °9 In Buckley v. New York
Post Corp.,21° the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
refused to consider the first amendment in determining jurisdiction over a
New York newspaper that distributed approximately 2,000 newspapers daily
in Connecticut.
2 11
Judge Friendly, writing for the majority, noted that ordinarily jurisdiction
in Connecticut would be proper because injury to the plaintiff's reputation
had occurred there.212 He acknowledged, however, the Fifth Circuit's rul-
ing in Connor that first amendment concerns play a role when the cost of
defense outweighs the benefits of in-state circulation.213 Observing that pub-
lishers are businesses established to make profits214 and that developments in
the substantive law of defamation were designed to mitigate the hazards of
minimum contacts test, they had not purposefully attempted to market their newspapers in the
state). Cf Stabler v. New York Times Co., 569 F. Supp. 1131 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (jurisdiction
allowed over the New York Times in Texas for distributing approximately 6,725 copies of a
defamatory article about a citizen of that state).
209. See, e.g., Comment, Constitutional Limitations to Long Arm Jurisdiction in Newspaper
Libel Cases, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 436 (1967); Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction Over Publishers:
To Chill a Mocking Word, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 342 (1967); Note, Exercise of Jurisdiction Over
a Newspaper Vacated on the Basis of the First Amendment, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 726 (1967);
Comment, Due Process and First Amendment Considerations in Libel Cases, 52 IowA L. REV.
1034 (1967); Recent Case, First Amendment Requires a Greater Showing of Contact in a Libel
Action to Satisfy Due Process Than Is Necessary in Other Types of Actions, 20 VAND. L. REV.
921 (1967). But see Note, Jurisdiction Meets the Press: First Amendment Considerations in
Jurisdictional Analysis, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975 (1982); Scott, Jurisdiction Over the Press:
A Survey and Analysis, 32 FED. COM. L.J. 19 (1980); Note, First Amendment's Role in Deter-
mining Place of Trial in Libel Actions, 66 MICH. L. REV. 542 (1968); Carrington & Martin,
Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 227 (1967).
210. 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967).
211. Id. at 177. Daily circulation of the Post in Connecticut averaged 1,707 copies. Week-
end circulation averaged 2,100. These figures did not include an indeterminate number of
newspapers bought in New York by Connecticut commuters to read on their way home. Id.
212. Id. at 181 (citing Elkhart Eng'g v. Dornier Werke, 343 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965), and
other tort cases allowing jurisdiction in the state of injury). The court also acknowledged the
general rule that injury from defamation is held to occur wherever the defamatory material is
circulated. Id. at 178. It pointed out that McGee could be read as allowing jurisdiction in the
state of injury. Id. at 181.
213, Id. at 182.
214. Id. The court noted that:
Newspapers, magazines, and broadcasting companies are businesses conducted for
profit and often make very large ones. Like other enterprises that inflict damage in
the course of performing a service highly useful to the public, such as providers of
food or shelter or manufacturers of drugs designed to ease or prolong life, they must
pay the freight; and injured persons should not be relegated to forums so distant as to
make collection of their claims difficult or impossible.
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defense in a distant and possibly hostile forum,21 5 he suggested that the first
amendment be considered for forum non conveniens, rather than in the ju-
risdictional analysis.216 In this case, he determined that the Post would be
unlikely to curtail its sales in Connecticut to avoid trial there. He noted the
larger number of copies circulated in this case than in Connor, the economic
and intellectual identity of New York City and lower Connecticut, the pro-
pinquity of the two jurisdictions, and the fact that a considerable number of
Connecticut residents commuted daily to New York where many of them
purchased copies of the Post at newsstands.2" 7 Under these circumstances,
he found that denial of jurisdiction would be unwarranted.2 1
Other courts agreed that the first amendment should not be considered in
the jurisdictional analysis. 21 9 Nevertheless, several of the United States Dis-
trict Courts in the Third,221 Seventh, 221 and Eleventh Circuits recently
adopted the Fifth Circuit's test. 22 2 These courts denied jurisdiction on first
amendment grounds over newspaper and magazine publishers that circu-
lated either a small number or a small percentage of copies in the forum state
and engaged in few other activities there.22 3
In addition, several state legislatures ensured that courts in their states
would not infringe on first amendment rights by expressly excluding jurisdic-
215. Id. (citing the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964)).
216. Id. at 183-84. See also Cordell v. Detective Publications, 307 F. Supp. 1212, 1216
(E.D. Tenn. 1968).
217. 373 F.2d at 184.
218. Id. One judge concurred separately. Id. (Medina, J. concurring). He would allow
jurisdiction but would reserve judgment on whether first amendment considerations should be
used for forum non conveniens purposes.
219. See Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 1978); Anselmi v.
Denver Post, Inc., 552 F.2d 316, 324 (10th Cir. 1977); Sipple v. Des Moines Register & Trib-
une Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 143, 148-50, 147 Cal. Rptr. 59, 62-63 (1978). But see Johnston v.
Time, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 837, 846-47 (M.D.N.C. 1970) (court considered the first amendment
but gave it very little weight).
220. McCabe v. Kevin Jenkins & Assocs., 531 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (no jurisdic-
tion over a small California magazine publisher with a monthly circulation of six copies in
Pennsylvania).
221. Gonzales v. Atlanta Constitution, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2146 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (no
jurisdiction over a Georgia newspaper publisher with a daily circulation of 37 copies in
Illinois).
222. Cox Enterprises v. Holt, 678 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1982) (former Fifth Circuit) (no
jurisdiction over a Georgia newspaper publisher with an indeterminate, but small, circulation
in Alabama); Ziegler v. Ring Publishing Corp., 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1303 (S.D. Fla. 1982)
(no jurisdiction over a New York magazine publisher with only 3.5% of its total circulation in
Florida).
223. Cox Enterprises, 678 F.2d at 939; McCabe, 531 F. Supp. at 655; Ziegler, 9 Media L.
Rep. at 1304; Gonzales, 4 Media L. Rep. at 2148.
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224tion for defamation from the tort provisions of their long-arm statutes.
These states did not deny plaintiffs complete access to the courts, however.
If the publisher's contacts were sufficient to meet another long-arm provi-
sion, such as one for doing business, a plaintiff could still bring suit.
2 The Effects Test: Basing Jurisdiction on Intended
or Foreseeable Injury
Some courts that declined to consider the first amendment in analyzing a
publisher's contacts used the effects test to determine whether a publisher
with limited circulation should be summoned to defend.22 5 In its broadest
sense, the effects test includes the stream of commerce theory, exemplified by
Gray, which enables courts to exercise jurisdiction over businesses that de-
rive economic benefit from ultimate sales in the forum state.22 6 When circu-
lation is very small, however, the stream of commerce form of the effects test
is inapplicable because the publisher derives little economic benefit from the
state. In such a case, the inquiry shifts to whether injury in the state is
intended or foreseeable.22 7
In contrast to cases like Roy v. North American Newspaper Alliance,
Inc. ,228 in which defamation was presumed foreseeable from the act of mar-
keting in the forum state, jurisdiction based on injury requires that foresee-
ability of defamation be shown by specific facts. Courts usually consider the
content of the allegedly defamatory publication, whether the publication is
likely to defame the plaintiff in that state, and the publisher's awareness that
the publication will be disseminated there. When the publisher has known
or intended that the publication defame the plaintiff in the forum state,
courts have required no additional contacts. 2 29 Nevertheless, when defama-
224. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-59(b) (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-10-91(2) (Michie 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 543.19(1)(d)(3) (West Supp. 1985); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 351.633 (Vernon 1966); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 302(a)(2), (3) (McKinney
1972). Florida formerly had such a rule, but dropped it in 1973. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.181 (West 1969) with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193 (West Supp. 1985). Maine requires
physical injury for jurisdiction under its tort provision. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 704-
A(2)(B) (1964). For a discussion of the New York provision, see 1 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN,
& A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE § 302.15, at 3-130 (1975). For a discussion of the
Georgia statute, see Bradley Management Servs. v. Cassells, 249 Ga. 614, 292 S.E.2d 717
(1982).
225. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37, supra note 18.
226. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
228. 106 N.H. 92, 205 A.2d 844 (1964).
229. See, e.g., Appleyard v. Transamerican Press, 539 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1976) (allowing
jurisdiction in North Carolina over a publisher that had directed libelous articles in its maga-
zine at a North Carolina resident), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); St. Clair v. Righter, 250
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tion has been merely foreseeable, although not intended, courts have looked
for other contacts to make assertion of jurisdiction more reasonable.
The leading case to assert jurisdiction for foreseeable injury was Anselmi v.
Denver Post, Inc.23 The plaintiffs in Anselmi, Wyoming politicians, sued the
Los Angeles Times and the Denver Post in Wyoming for publishing articles
that implicated them in gun running and for releasing the stories to their
news services.231 The story was published in several other newspapers, in-
cluding some in Wyoming. Despite a Wyoming circulation of only five to
twenty-three copies daily, the Los Angeles Times was held subject to suit.232
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit based jurisdic-
tion not only on the Times' limited circulation but also on its general busi-
ness contacts with Wyoming, 233 its having sent three reporters to the state to
develop the story, 34 and the substantial and foreseeable effect the article had
produced there.25 The court found the story capable of inflicting injury in
Wyoming because Wyoming readers had considerable interest in it, more
than readers in other states.236 The Tenth Circuit interpreted International
Shoe, McGee, and Hanson to allow jurisdiction for a single transaction in the
state, such as this tort, provided that the defendant had some connection to
the state and the suit was related to the defendant's activities there.237 The
Tenth Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit's requirement ot greater contacts for
first amendment concerns because it would place too great a burden on Wy-
oming residents who wish to vindicate their reputations.238 Instead, it found
jurisdiction reasonable because the Times had "released a force which took
effect in Wyoming.,
239
F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Va. 1966) (allowing jurisdiction for purposefully mailing defamatory let-
ters into Virginia "calculated to have an effect" there).
230. 552 F.2d 316 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 911 (1977).
231. Id. The story appeared not only in the Los Angeles Times but also in newspapers
published in Wyoming and other states. The Times contended it had no subscribers to its news
service in Wyoming and that, if Wyoming newspapers did publish the story, they did so in
violation of its copyright. Id. at 317.
232. Id. at 325. Jurisdiction over the Denver Post was not at issue.
233. Id. The Times sold syndicated features to Wyoming newspapers and solicited Wyo-
ming advertisers.
234. Id. The Wyoming long-arm statute applied to the case allowed jurisdiction for caus-
ing tortious injury by an act committed in the state.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 323-24. Anselmi was decided before Shaffer but foreshadowed Shaffer's "rela-
tionship among the defendant, the forum and the litigation." See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 204 (1977).
238. 552 F.2d at 324-25.
239. Id. at 325. See also McGuire v. Brightman, 79 Cal. App. 3d 776, 145 Cal. Rptr. 256
(1978); infra notes 267-70 and accompanying text.
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In Anselmi, forum state injury was foreseeable from the content of the
article and the plaintiffs' residence. When the text of the publication has not
readily identified the plaintiff, however, a publisher with limited circulation
in the state may have little reason to foresee injury or to expect a defamation
suit there. In such a case, exercise of jurisdiction would be unfair unless the
publisher had significant additional contacts. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion in Church of
Scientology v. Adams.2" In Adams, the California Church of Scientology
sued the publisher of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch in California for printing a
series of articles about scientology. The article did not mention the Califor-
nia church, the events discussed did not take place in California, and the
articles were not aimed at a California audience.241 Because no reporter had
traveled to California to gather information for the series, the only contact
on which jurisdiction could be based was the circulation in California of
between 121 and 156 copies of each of the articles.242 Applying Shaffer's
test, the court found the relationship between the publisher, the state, and
the litigation too attenuated for jurisdiction.243 It reasoned that the pub-
lisher could not have foreseen a defamation suit in California based on these
particular articles.2 "
Recently, courts have retreated from Anselmi's expansive view of jurisdic-
tion. In Sipple v. Des Moines Register and Tribune Co.,245 the California
Court of Appeals denied jurisdiction over several out-of-state newspapers
that had reported that the plaintiff was a homosexual. At the time, the
plaintiff, a California resident, was in the "national limelight" for thwarting
an attempt on President Ford's life.246 None of the newspapers in question
had sent reporters to California to develop the story. The only contact any
of them had with the state was the circulation there of approximately 0.3%
of their total circulation. 247 The California court distinguished this case
from Anselmi in that no reporters had gone to the state to cover the story,
nor had these newspapers transmitted the story to a news service for addi-
240. 584 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1978).
241. Id. at 895. The articles described scientology generally and the Church of Scientology
of Missouri in particular.
242. Id. at 896. These figures represented 0.04% of the paper's total circulation. Although
2.91% of the newspaper's advertising revenues came from California, the court did not con-
sider advertising a jurisdictionally significant contact because it was unrelated to the cause of
action. Id.
243. Id. at 899 (citing Shaffer, 433 U.S at 204). See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
244. Id.
245. 82 Cal. App. 3d 143, 147 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1978).
246. Id. at 146-47, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
247. Id. at 147, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 61. The actual circulation figures were not given.
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tional publication.248 Furthermore, it found the story itself to be of national
importance. Ignoring the fact that the plaintiff was a resident, the court
concluded that the story could have no foreseeably greater effect in Califor-
nia than anywhere else.249
Other courts have been less explicit in their analysis than the Sipple court.
Nevertheless, Sipple suggests a trend to allow jurisdiction for foreseeable def-
amation only when Anselmi's fact pattern has been met or exceeded. 250 Af-
ter Sipple, several courts have resorted to denying jurisdiction on first
amendment grounds when confronted with difficult fact patterns. 251
III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER AUTHORS AND EDITORS
Traditionally, liability for defamation lies with all who take a responsible
part in communicating it. 2 52 Authors, and even editors, may be held liable
for their roles in writing and editing a defamatory statement.2 53 Recently,
there has been a trend to sue nonresident authors along with their publish-
ers. 254 In several cases, however, courts have failed to analyze author's con-
tacts separately from those of their publishers.25 5 Usually, a court will assert
jurisdiction over both the publisher and the author or over neither.
Prior to International Shoe, no means existed for asserting jurisdiction
over nonresident authors unless they had consented to suit or could be found
within the state's borders. 256 Although the minimum contacts theory ex-
248. Id. at 151-52, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
249. Id. at 152, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
250. Only one court has granted jurisdiction over a publisher on the basis of Anselmi. In
Stabler v. New York Times Co., 569 F. Supp. 1131 (S.D. Tex. 1983), the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas asserted jurisdiction over the New York Times for
developing a colorful story about a Texas resident that foreseeably produced great reader inter-
est in Texas. The Times also maintained a news bureau in Houston and circulated 6,725 cop-
ies of the alleged libel in the state.
251. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
252. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 113 (5th Ed. 1984).
253. Id.
254. See, e.g., Cox Enterprises v. Holt, 678 F.2d 936 (lth Cir. 1982); Church of
Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1978); McCabe v. Kevin Jenkins & Assocs., 531
F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Ziegler v. Ring Publishing Corp., 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1303
(S.D. Fla. 1982); Carter v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 514 F. Supp. 12 (W.D. Okla.
1980); Gonzales v. Atlanta Constitution, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2146 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Mc-
Bride v. Owens, 454 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Sipple v. Des Moines Register & Tribune
Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 143, 147 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1978); McGuire v. Brightman, 79 Cal. App. 3d
776, 145 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1978).
255. See Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1978); McCabe v. Kevin
Jenkins & Assocs., 531 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Carter v. Houston Chronicle Publishing
Co., 514 F. Supp. 12 (W.D. Okla. 1980); Johnston v. Time, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 837 (M.D.N.C.
1970).
256. Jurisdiction over individuals was governed by Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878),
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panded available bases for jurisdiction, no court has been able to find an
author amenable to suit on a pure doing business theory.2 57 Even when the
state has been the focus of business transactions between the author and the
publisher, the court has used the tortious act theory to assert jurisdiction.25 a
In cases considering the contacts of staff reporters, the issue on which
most decisions have turned has been whether the author traveled to the state
or called persons there to gather news.25 9 If the reporter has not gone to the
state or placed calls there, courts usually have denied jurisdiction for lack of
contact 260 or for lack of purposeful activity in the forum state.
26 1
One court did allow jurisdiction even though the authors, syndicated col-
umnists, had not gathered news in the state. In McBride v. Owens,262 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas allowed the
columnists to be sued in Texas because distribution of their column in that
state was foreseeable and part of a concerted effort to achieve wide circula-
tion.26 3 In addition, the authors had derived revenue from their column's
sale to Texas newspapers. 2 64 The court likened their contacts to those of a
national publisher that had launched its publication in the stream of com-
merce.265 First amendment considerations also failed to tip the balance. Be-
cause of the benefits the columnists derived from Texas, litigation in Texas
would not chill the continued publication of the column there.2 66
Although McBride is the only case upholding jurisdiction over authors
using the stream of commerce test, one court has upheld jurisdiction over a
nonresident author using a foreseeable injury test. In McGuire v.
which required a nonresident individual to be present in the forum state for valid service of
process.
257. See, e.g., Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959);
Novel v. Garrison, 294 F. Supp. 825 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
258. Novel v. Garrison, 294 F. Supp. 825 (1969).
259. See Cox Enterprises v. Holt, 678 F.2d 936 (1 1th Cir. 1982); Ziegler v. Ring Publishing
Corp., 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1303 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Gonzales v. Atlanta Constitution, 4
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2146 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Sipple v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 82
Cal. App. 3d 143, 147 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1978); McGuire v. Brightman, 79 Cal. App. 3d 776, 145
Cal. Rptr. 256 (1978). See also Margoles v. Johns, 483 F.2d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (jurisdic-
tion can be based only on an act taking place in the District of Columbia, not on a telephone
call from outside).
260. Ziegler, 9 Media L. Rep. at 1304; Gonzales, 4 Media L. Rep. at 2148; Sipple, 82 Cal.
App. at 147, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
261. Cox, 678 F.2d at 939.
262. 454 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
263. Id. at 737.
264. Id.
265. Id. See also Process Church of the Final Judgment v. Sanders, 338 F. Supp. 1396
(N.D. Ill. 1972) (jurisdiction allowed over a book author and publisher on the stream of com-
merce theory).
266. 454 F. Supp. at 737.
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Brightman,267 the California Court of Appeals gave full faith and credit to a
South Dakota judgment against the president of a Native American organi-
zation who had written and published an article libelling the plaintiff in his
organization's newspaper. The plaintiff was a doctor at a Public Health Ser-
vice hospital on a South Dakota reservation.2 6' The defendant had gathered
the information for the article while on a trip to South Dakota and had
published it, knowing that 4.3% of the paper's 1193 subscribers resided in
South Dakota.2 69 The California court found jurisdiction proper because of
the author's purposeful acts of gathering the information in state and pub-
lishing it, coupled with the knowledge that the article would be circulated in
South Dakota, where it would injure the plaintiff.27 °
The reluctance of courts to assert jurisdiction over newspaper and maga-
zine authors without a showing of presence in the state contrasts sharply
with their willingness to allow jurisdiction over individuals who have sent
defamatory letters into the forum state.271 In these cases, courts have not
required that a person enter the state to be amenable to suit. Rather, they
have emphasized that the purposeful nature of sending the letters, as well as
the foreseeability of harm, are jurisdictionally significant contacts.272
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN KEETON AND CALDER
A. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.
The question whether the exercise of jurisdiction offends due process usually
has arisen when a plaintiff has brought suit in his home state against an out-
of-state publisher. On a few occasions, plaintiffs have sought to sue publish-
ers in states in which neither resided.273 Usually these plaintiffs have been
unsuccessful. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong,274 the only publishing
case to address the issue directly, the Fifth Circuit disallowed jurisdiction on
the ground that the forum state had no special interest in the matter.275
267. 79 Cal. App. 3d 766, 145 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1978).
268. Id. at 779, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 788, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
271. See Rusack v. Harsha, 470 F. Supp. 285 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (jurisdiction allowed in
Pennsylvania for sending a copy of a letter defaming the plaintiff to his employer); St. Clair v.
Righter, 250 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Va. 1966) (jurisdiction allowed in Virginia for purposefully
mailing letters to Virginia residents to persuade them to sue the plaintiff). See also Murphy v.
Erwin-Wasey, Inc., 460 F.2d 661 (1st Cir. 1972) (jurisdiction allowed in Massachusetts for
intentionally misrepresenting earnings on a contract in letters mailed into the state).
272. Rusack, 470 F. Supp. at 291; St. Clair, 250 F. Supp. at 154.
273. See, e.g., Bulletin Co. v. Origoni, 387 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 928
(1967); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966).
274. 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966).
275. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc. 276 on similar grounds. Kathy Keeton, a New York
resident, brought a libel action in New Hampshire against Hustler Maga-
zine.27 7 The suit sought nationwide damages for defamatory photographs,
text, and cartoons appearing in five issues of Hustler published between Sep-
tember 1975 and May 1976.7 Keeton chose New Hampshire because it
was the only state in which the statute of limitations had not run.2 7 9
Hustler was incorporated in Ohio and had its principal place of business
in California.280 The publisher's only contact with New Hampshire was the
distribution of its magazine by independent contractors.2"' Sales in New
Hampshire amounted to less than one percent of Hustler's total United
States circulation.28 2 Keeton's only connection with New Hampshire was
the circulation there of Penthouse Magazine, of which she was a corporate
officer.283 Her name appeared on the Penthouse masthead.28 4
Applying World-Wide Volkswagen's balancing test for determining the
reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction,28 5 the First Circuit stated that if
Keeton had been a New Hampshire resident suing for New Hampshire dam-
ages, Hustler's circulation of its magazines in New Hampshire would suffice
for jurisdiction.286 Such a suit would be fair because Hustler's limited con-
tacts would combine with Keeton's many contacts and with the state's inter-
est in protecting its residents.28 7
276. 682 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1982).
277. Id. In an earlier action, Keeton had sued for libel and invasion of privacy in Ohio.
Her libel claim was dismissed as barred by the Ohio statute of limitations, and her claim for
invasion of privacy was held barred by the New York statute of limitations, as applied by the
Ohio court. This suit was brought after the Ohio claims were dismissed. Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 n.l (1984).
278. 104 S. Ct. at 1477. The material contained allegations about the plaintiff's sex life. It
included photographs of a nude woman, falsely identified as the plaintiff. Brief for Petitioner
at 2-3, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
279. Id. See also 682 F.2d at 33.
280. 104 S. Ct. at 1477.
281. 682 F.2d at 33.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 33-34. She was also an editor of Viva and Omni Magazines.
284. Id. at 34.
285. 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
286. 682 F.2d at 34-35. The First Circuit found support for such an action in Buckley v.
New York Post Co., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967), and in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383
F.2d 586, 591-92 (5th Cir. 1967). It noted that New Hampshire's long-arm statutes were
intended to reach to the limits of due process. 682 F.2d at 33.
287. Id. at 35. The First Circuit did observe that the United States Supreme Court in
World- Wide Volkswagen had suggested in dicta that an out-of-state plaintiff could properly sue
an out-of-state defendant that marketed its products in such a way as to expect them to be sold
in the forum state. Id. (citing World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286, 297-98).
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The difficulty for the court in this case was that, although some of the
alleged damages could be attributed to Hustler's New Hampshire activity,
most damages related to circulation outside the state.288 Because New
Hampshire followed the single publication rule,28 9 however, damages arising
in all states could be recovered in this single suit.290 Moreover, the statute of
limitations already had run in every state but New Hampshire. 291 Allowing
suit in New Hampshire would revive an action barred everywhere else.292
The First Circuit determined that suit in New Hampshire would be unfair
under these circumstances.293 New Hampshire had no particular interest in
protecting a nonresident from defamation occurring primarily in other
states.294 Moreover, if it did have such an interest, that interest was out-
weighed by the policies of finality and repose underlying statutes of limita-
tions.295 The court concluded that in this case Hustler's contacts were too
insubstantial to support jurisdiction over such a large multistate claim.296
The Supreme Court reversed.2 97 It found Hustler's "regular circulation of
magazines in the forum state .. sufficient to support an assertion of juris-
diction in a libel action based on the contents of the magazine. '298 Noting
that Hustler's monthly circulation in New Hampshire amounted to 10,000
to 15,000 copies, 299 the Court concluded that Hustler's activity could not be
called "random, isolated, or fortuitous."'3"° Rather, as the United States
District Court for the District of New Hampshire found, dissemination of
the magazines was directed purposefully at New Hampshire and inevitably
had had an effect there.30'
288. Id. at 35.
289. See supra note 22.
290. 682 F.2d at 35.
291. Id. at 33.
292. Id. at 35.
293. Id. at 36.
294. Id. (citing Roy v. North Am. Newspaper Alliance, 106 N.H. 92, 97, 205 A.2d 844,
847 (1964)).
295. Ik at 35-36.
296. Id. at 36. The First Circuit noted that it was not deciding that an out-of-state plaintiff
could never sue an out-of-state publisher, only that "the New Hampshire tail [was] too small
to wag so large an out-of-state dog" in this case. Id.
297. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1477. The Court gives the figures as "10 to 15,000." Id. A close reading of the
petitioner's brief mades clear that monthly circulation was between 10,000 and 15,000 copies.
Brief for Petitioner at 10-12, 16, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
300. Id. at 1478.
301. Id. (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., No. C-80-498-D (D.N.H. June 18,
1981)). The District Court had denied jurisdiction, however, on the same grounds as the First
Circuit.
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The Court maintained that the concerns of the First Circuit-the multi-
state nature of the action, the extremely long statute of limitations, and the
plaintiff's lack of New Hampshire contacts-were insufficient to defeat
otherwise proper jurisdiction.30 ' The Court conceded, however, that the
multistate nature of the action was a factor to be considered in determining
the fairness of bringing the suit in New Hampshire.30 3
In contrast to the First Circuit, the Supreme Court found that New
Hampshire did have sufficient interest in the case for jurisdiction. 3°  Kee-
ton's complaint alleged tort damages suffered in New Hampshire. 3°" For its
part, New Hampshire had expressed an interest in redressing torts occurring
within its borders.30 6 The Court maintained that this interest could properly
extend to torts committed against nonresidents.3 °7 In fact, New Hampshire
had shown such an interest by deleting from its long-arm statute a restric-
tion that plaintiffs be residents.30 8
In addition to its interest in redressing torts, New Hampshire, in following
the single publication rule, shared an interest with other states in providing a
single forum for the efficient adjudication of defamation suits. 3°  The Court
concluded that these two legitimate state interests made New Hampshire a
proper forum for Keeton's multistate suit.310
The Court stressed that choice of law concerns, such as the length of stat-
utes of limitations, should have nothing to do with the jurisdictional in-
quiry.31' Finding a favorable statute is part of an overall litigation strategy,
302. 104 S. Ct. at 1478.
303. Id. (citing Shaffer's "relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,"
433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
304. Id. at 1478. Both courts used the balancing test from World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. 286, 292 (1980), to determine the fairness of suit in New Hampshire. Nevertheless, they
arrived at different results.
305. Id. at 1479.
306. Id. (citing Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 298, 319 A.2d 626, 629 (1974)).
307. Id. at 1479. The Court pointed out that a libel occurs wherever it is circulated. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A comment a (1977). The Supreme Court con-
cluded that injury to Keeton in New Hampshire was conceivable because a libel could harm
someone previously unknown by creating a negative reputation. 104 S. Ct. at 1479. The Court
added that it was not relying on the fact that Keeton's name appeared on the masthead of
several magazines circulated in the state. Id. at 1479 n.5.
308. 104 S. Ct. at 1479. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 300:14 history (1977). In addition,
the Court noted that New Hampshire's criminal defamation statute was not limited to wrongs
against residents. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 644:11(I) (1974).
309. 104 S. Ct. at 1480. The Court noted that the interstate judicial system benefited from
the single publication rule because it reduces the drain on judicial resources and protects de-
fendants from multiple harassing lawsuits. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958)).
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not an indication of due process unfairness. 312 The question whether New
Hampshire's extremely long statute of limitations should be applied to all
damages should be raised after jurisdiction has been established. The Court
also noted that it had never required the plaintiff to reside in the forum state
in order to sue a nonresident defendant that met the minimum contacts
test.313
Finally, the Court declared that, by "continuously and deliberately"
3 1 4
marketing its magazines in the forum state, Hustler reasonably could antici-
pate being summoned to defend a libel action arising from the content of
those magazines. 31 5 The Court emphasized that a publisher who regularly
circulates "a substantial number of copies" 3 16 of its magazine in the forum
state cannot claim due process unfairness in having to appear there. Fur-
thermore, because a defendant can be charged with knowledge of the state's
laws, a publisher of a national magazine must reasonably expect that a defa-
mation suit will seek nationwide damages under the single publication
rule.
3 17
B. Calder v. Jones
In Calder v. Jones,31 8 the Court was called upon to decide whether Cali-
fornia could validly assert jurisdiction over two Florida residents for writing
and editing a defamatory magazine article. Entertainer Shirley Jones, a Cali-
fornia resident, brought an action against the National Enquirer; its distrib-
uting company; its editor, lain Calder; and its reporter, John South, for
publishing an article through which, she claimed, they sought intentionally
to injure her personal and business reputations.31 9
Only Calder and South contested California's jurisdiction.32 ° Calder
312. 104 S. Ct. at 1480.
313. Id. at 1480-81. On the contrary, the Court stated that it had previously upheld juris-
diction in a case in which neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was a resident of the forum
state. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
314. 104 S. Ct. at 1481.
315. Id. (citing the foreseeability test of World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98).
316. 104 S. Ct. at 1482.
317. Id. at 1481-82. Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment. Id. at 1482 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). He agreed that Hustler's regular circulation of magazines in New Hampshire was
sufficient for jurisdiction in a cause of action relating to the contents of the magazines. More-
over, he would find jurisdiction fair without regard to the state's interest in redressing libels or
applying its statute of limitations. State interests, he argued, should be relevant only to pro-
tecting individual liberty interests under due process. Id. at 1482 (citing Insurance Corp. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982)).
318. 104 S. Ct. at 1482.
319. Id. at 1484.
320. Id. at 1485.
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claimed he had not entered California or made any telephone calls to per-
sons there while editing the Jones article.321 South argued that his only con-
tacts with California while researching the article were one trip to gather
information and a few telephone calls to verify it.322 The Superior Court for
the County of Los Angeles agreed these contacts were insubstantial.323 The
court recognized that it could assert jurisdiction using the effects test but
decided that first amendment considerations precluded it.324 In the court's
view, the threat of being called to defend in a distant forum against sizeable
claims of punitive damages could easily chill the willingness of reporters and
editors to write controversial stories. 325
The California Court of Appeal reversed.326 It rejected the first amend-
ment test, pointing out that both California and the Ninth Circuit previously
had refused to adopt it. 32 7 The court found jurisdiction proper over both
defendants under the effects test because of their intent to cause tortious
injury in California. 328 The court held that due process did not require a
defendant's physical presence in the forum state for jurisdiction.329 More-
over, if physical presence was required, the Court of Appeal concluded that
South's visit and telephone calls constituted sufficient contacts for jurisdic-
tion over him.3 30 It noted that one of South's calls, placed to Jones and her
husband, Marty Ingels, just before publication, directly caused some of the
injury alleged.
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the California Court of Ap-
peal,3 31 observing that the National Enquirer was circulated heavily in Cali-
fornia, where Jones lived and worked.332 It stated that although the plaintiff
need not reside in the forum state, the plaintiff's contacts there might be so
great as to enhance the defendant's contacts and make jurisdiction over a
defendant with relatively few contacts proper.3 33 Here, California was "the
321. Id. He had been in California only twice: once for pleasure and once to testify in an
unrelated case.
322. Id.
323. Jones v. National Enquirer, Inc., No. C 305 009 (Super. Ct. L.A. Oct. 2, 1981).
324. Id. The Superior Court observed that if Jones had been physically injured by a defec-
tive product, it would clearly have had jurisdiction under the authority of Buckeye Boiler Co.
v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
325. Id.
326. Jones v. Calder, 138 Cal. App. 3d 128, 187 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1982).
327. Id. at 132, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
328. Id. at 134, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
329. Id. at 133-34, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
330. Id. at 135, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
331. Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984).
332. Id. at 1484-85.
333. Id. at 1486. The Court observed that in this case, as in McGee, "the plaintiff [was] the
focus of the activities of the defendants out of which the suit arises." Id.
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focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered"; 334 it was the center
of the activities described in the story; it was where information for the arti-
cle originated; and it was where most of the injury occurred.335 In writing
and editing the story, South and Calder knew it would have a substantial
effect on Jones.336 They also knew the article would be circulated in Califor-
nia and would cause considerable harm there.337 Thus, the Court found
jurisdiction over Calder and South proper under the effects test for their
intentional acts aimed expressly at California. 338 The Court based its hold-
ing solely on the intent of the writers and declined to consider the author's
trip or telephone calls to California in making its decision. a39
Calder and South had argued that they should not be drawn into jurisdic-
tion by their employer's decision to market its magazines in California, a
decision over which they had no control and from which they derived no
financial benefit. 3 ' The Court rejected this argument. It noted that
although employees' contacts must be judged separately from those of their
employer, employees are not insulated from jurisdiction by their status.34'
The Court firmly rejected the need to find a greater showing of contacts
for first amendment concerns. a42 The Court pointed out that through cases
like New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan 4 3 and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 344
safeguards had been developed in the substantive law of defamation to pro-
tect first amendment rights.345 In the Court's view, consideration of the first
amendment at the jurisdictional stage as well as during trial on the merits
would amount to "double counting."3 46
334. Id. at 1487.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286, 297-98, and the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37).
339. Id. at 1486 n.6.
340. Id. at 1487. They had analogized their position to that of a welder who fashions a
boiler that ultimately injures someone in another state. They argued that jurisdiction over the
welder does not follow from jurisdiction over the manufacturer. Id.
341. Id. (observing that Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 322 (1980), requires that each
defendant's contacts be assessed individually).
342. Id.
343. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
344. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
345. 104 S. Ct. at 1488.
346. Id. To rule otherwise would give defendants in defamation cases special procedural
protections not accorded in other types of cases.
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V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF KEETON AND CALDER FOR JURISDICTION
OVER NONRESIDENT PUBLISHERS AND AUTHORS
Although Keeton and Calder are the first cases since McGee in which the
Supreme Court has allowed personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defend-
ant, the Court's basic analytical approach is consistent with its earlier deci-
sions.347 As in Hanson, Shaffer, Kulko, and World- Wide Volkswagen, the
Court in Keeton and Calder first determined whether the defendant had a
jurisdictionally cognizable contact with the forum state that was related to
the cause of action.348 Then, in Keeton, it balanced the interests of the state
against the inconvenience to the defendant in being sued there.349 Unlike
the four earlier cases, the defendants in Keeton and Calder did have a juris-
dictionally cognizable contact. The contacts in both cases had a direct rela-
tionship to the cause of action for defamation. In both cases the defendant's
acts were purposefully directed at the forum state.
In Keeton and Calder, the Supreme Court approved the effects test in both
its stream of commerce form and its intentional injury form. As in McGee,
the Court did not require the defendants to be physically present in the fo-
rum state for jurisdiction. Instead, the Court based its holdings on acts it
found to be purposefully directed at the forum state and directly related to
the cause of action. Contrary to dicta in Kulko, the Court did not require a
showing of physical injury in either case as a prerequisite for jurisdiction,
nor did it require the defendants in Calder to have reaped commercial bene-
fit from the forum state.350 Thus, the Court's holdings in these cases are
more expansive than earlier decisions might indicate.
In Keeton, the Court allowed jurisdiction although Hustler's only contact
with New Hampshire was the circulation of its magazines in the state by
independent middlemen. Keeton thus affirms dicta in World- Wide Volk-
swagen suggesting that the Court would approve the stream of commerce
theory.351 It also differs little from lower court decisions using the stream of
commerce theory to assert jurisdiction over publishers.3" 2 Nevertheless, it
clearly calls into question a case like Birdsong35 3 in which jurisdiction was
347. For a discussion of the Court's analytical approach in the earlier cases, see Louis,
supra note 78. See also Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State
Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SuP. CT. REV. 77.
348. Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1478; Calder, 104 S. Ct. at 1486.
349. Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1481-82.
350. Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 96-97 (1978). See supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
351. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980). See supra
notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.
353. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966).
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denied because the court determined that the state had no interest in litiga-
tion concerning nonresidents.354
In Calder, jurisdiction was based solely on the author's and editor's acts of
writing and editing an article that they knew would cause harm in the forum
state.3 " The Court expressly ignored a trip and telephone calls the author
had made to the state in reaching its holding.356 No court before Calder had
found jurisdiction over an author under the intentional injury test without a
showing of presence.357 Thus, the Supreme Court in Calder went farther
than lower courts in asserting jurisdiction over magazine and newspaper au-
thors. On the other hand, several lower courts have held private individuals
subject to suit for the mere act of intentionally sending defamatory letters
into the forum state.35 In effect, it is these cases that the Court approved by
its holding in Calder. The Court apparently found no reason to distinguish
magazine and newspaper authors from private individuals.
Not only do Keeton and Calder uphold the effects test, they also resolve
the debate among drafters of the tort provisions of state long-arm statutes.
After Hanson, several states, to obviate due process concerns, adopted stat-
utes that required the defendant to have engaged in business activity or some
other persistent course of conduct before a court could exercise jurisdiction
for an extraterritorial act.359 Now, to be consistent with due process, these
states no longer need to require that the defendant engage in in-state activity.
In Calder, the Court rejected the need for any special jurisdictional test
for publishers and authors because of first amendment concerns. 36° It
reached this conclusion without much discussion, other than to observe that
first amendment safeguards exist in the substantive law of defamation.361
Nevertheless, this decision comports with the Court's recent trend to keep
the minimum contacts test free from exceptions.362 It also agrees with sev-
eral lower courts and commentators that would strengthen the substantive
law of defamation for first amendment concerns rather than complicate the
jurisdictional inquiry.363 Such a policy is sound, as long as the substantive
354. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
355. Calder, 104 S. Ct. at 1487.
356. Id. at 1486 n.6.
357. See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
359. For a discussion of the state tort provisions, see supra notes 143-47 and accompanying
text.
360. 104 S. Ct. at 1487-88.
361. Id. at 1488.
362. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980) (rejecting Seider jurisdiction); World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (rejecting automobile exception); Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186
(1977) (rejecting some forms of quasi in rem jurisdiction).
363. See supra notes 215, 219 and accompanying text.
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law is applied diligently enough to deter lawsuits brought merely to harass
the publisher. It is consistent with the view that the jurisdictional inquiry
stands merely as a preliminary step in the litigation, one to be followed by
other steps with appropriate safeguards.
Although Calder rejected first amendment concerns as a due process re-
quirement, it did not address the issue of long-arm statutes that exclude def-
amation from their tort provisions for first amendment concerns.3 4 Because
states traditionally have been allowed to require more contacts than are
needed for due process,365 these states should be able to retain their restric-
tions despite Calder's holding. No state is required to expand its statutory
jurisdiction.
The newsgathering exception of the District of Columbia Circuit3 66
presents a different question. The District of Columbia court never made
clear whether the exception was based on the first amendment, the com-
merce clause, or some other rationale.3 67 If the exception is based on the
first amendment, it should be overruled. If it is based on the commerce
clause, it should still be valid because the Supreme Court has never over-
ruled its commerce clause cases.368 Conversely, if the exception is based on
neither constitutional provision, the court should address the question
through minimum contacts analysis. Thus, the court should determine
whether the defendant's newsgathering is directly related to the cause of ac-
tion, and thus a jurisdictionally significant factor, or whether it is unrelated
and should be relegated to a role of lesser or no jurisdictional significance.
Because of Calder, courts that have used first amendment considerations
in the past now will have to use other means to determine jurisdiction over
nonresident publishers and authors with limited contacts. Although both
Keeton and Calder affirm the trend among lower courts to expand their exer-
cise of jurisdiction over nonresident publishers and authors, they fail to an-
swer what degree of contacts represents the minimum required for
jurisdiction. The actual contacts in both cases were substantial compared to
many decided cases. Indeed, each case represents one end of the effects test
spectrum, with Keeton on the stream of commerce end and Calder on the
intentional injury end.
To develop a model for analysis, tests devised in Edwards,3 69 Rebozo,37 °
364. For a discussion of these statutes, see supra note 224 and accompanying text.
365. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 119, 123 and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 119.
368. See Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 983-87.
369. Edwards v. Associated Press, 512 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1975).
370. Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 515 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1975).
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Anselmi,371' and Adams 3 7 2 are instructive. In Edwards, the Fifth Circuit
based jurisdiction on the defendant's act of purposefully directing its news
into the forum state.37 3 This was the only contact and it was directly related
to the cause of action. Other contacts were unnecessary for jurisdiction. In
Rebozo, the contact directly related to the cause of action, circulation, was
limited.374 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit considered newsgathering, ad-
vertising solicitation, and other business activities as contacts supporting the
fairness of jurisdiction.375 In Anselmi, circulation was considerably smaller
than in Rebozo.376 The Tenth Circuit considered the same supporting con-
tacts as the Fifth Circuit in Rebozo, as well as the fact that the allegedly
libelious article had great reader interest in the forum state.377 Finally, the
Ninth Circuit in Adams suggested that a court might consider whether the
publisher has attempted to market its publications in the state.378 If it has
not sought that market, and other contacts are negligible, jurisdiction should
not be exercised unless defamation in that state is foreseeable or intended.379
A model for analysis can be developed from these cases. For a publisher,
the court should first decide whether jurisdiction can be based on circulation
alone. If it cannot, the court should then consider whether the publisher has
had additional contacts that would show an attempt to derive financial bene-
fit from the forum state. If the publisher's other contacts are minimal or if
the publisher has sought no benefit from the state, the court should then
determine whether the defendant could reasonably foresee causing defama-
tion in the forum state. Finally, if the publisher has had no other contact
with the state, the court should decide whether the publisher intended to
injure the plaintiff there.
Most cases concerning nonresident authors and editors usually will in-
volve a single contact like Calder. Thus, courts will have to decide whether
the author or editor intentionally sought to aim the defamatory article at the
forum state or whether the defendant had reason to know that the plaintiff
would be injured there. Although in most situations only the intentional
371. Anselmi v. Denver Post Co., 552 F.2d 316 (10th Cir. 1977).
372. Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1978).
373. 512 F.2d at 267-68.
374. In-state circulation averaged 622 copies daily and 684 copies on Sunday. 515 F.2d at
1210.
375. Id. at 1215-16. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
376. In Anselmi, in-state circulation averaged between 5 and 23 copies daily. 552 F.2d at
325. The publisher also had released the article to its news service. Id. at 317. Thus, copies
from subscriber newspapers may have been circulated in the state.
377. Id. at 325. See supra notes 233-37 and accompanying text.
378. 584 F.2d at 896.
379. Id. at 897-98.
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effects test will apply to nonresident authors and editors, the stream of com-
merce theory might be applicable to some authors, such as syndicated col-
umnists.380 In these cases, the Keeton test would apply.
Finally, plaintiffs will have to consider where to bring suit. Unlike most
torts, defamation can occur in many places at the same time. In Keeton, the
Court found no reason to deny access to the forum simply because the plain-
tiff was a nonresident.3"' Thus after Keeton, a plaintiff can conceivably bring
suit in any state in which the publisher has regularly and deliberately circu-
lated its publications, as long as the state's long-arm statute allows suit by a
nonresident38 2 and the court can find a state interest in the litigation.
In contrast to Keeton, the Court in Calder emphasized the importance of
the plaintiff's residence in the forum state as a factor enhancing the defend-
ants' contacts. 383 Although the Court did not elaborate on its "enhance-
ment" concept, presumably it meant that the defendants in Calder clearly
knew that the plaintiff would be injured in California because she lived there.
Nevertheless, to be consistent with Keeton, courts should not require that
the plaintiff reside in the forum state for jurisdiction under the intentional
effects test. Instead, they should consider the degree to which the defendant
knew the plaintiff would suffer injury there. If the defendant clearly knew
that his actions would injure the plaintiff's reputation in the forum state, the
state should be able to assert jurisdiction. Alternatively, if injury to reputa-
tion was merely foreseeable, additional contacts should be required and the
court should seriously balance the conveniences of holding trial.
VI. CONCLUSION
Keeton and Calder provide guidance to lower federal and state courts for
determining whether they have personal jurisdiction over nonresident pub-
lishers and authors. Keeton approves the effects test in its stream of com-
merce form, already widely accepted for obtaining jurisdiction over
nonresident publishers. It extends the application of this test to multistate
actions involving the single publication rule. Calder approves the effects test
for intentional injury. A few courts had accepted this test, but had applied it
more narrowly than the Supreme Court, requiring the defendant's physical
presence in the forum state for jurisdiction. Calder also resolved a major
split among courts concerning whether first amendment considerations
380. This theory was used in McBride v. Owens, 454 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Tex. 1978). See
supra notes 262-66 and accompanying text.
381. Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1480-81.
382. Some states do have provisions in their long-arm statutes requiring that the plaintiff be
a resident of the state. Keeton does not overturn these statutes.
383. Calder, 104 S. Ct. at 1486-87.
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should enter into the jurisdictional analysis. The Court determined that they
should not.
Although Keeton and Calder resolved the question of what jurisdictional
theories may be applied to nonresident publishers, the opinions failed to ad-
dress what contacts constitute the "minimum" required for jurisdiction over
nonresident publishers and authors. Courts will have to make this determi-
nation themselves, considering the defendant's actions to circulate its publi-
cations in the forum state or defendant's knowledge that the plaintiff would
be harmed there. To the extent that contacts are minimal and injury from
defamation is merely foreseeable, courts should continue to weigh the conve-
niences of standing trial.
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